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Abstract
Game theory deals with the modeling of strategic interaction between agents. Central to the
predictions produced by this framework are the assumption made on rationality and how
choices are made. While crucial to the outcomes predicted there exists little to no work
investigating the similarities and differences between different strategy protocol updates. In
this work, I develop a new protocol for simulating how agents think that I term foresight and
compare and contrast it with commonly used protocols. Foresight is a way of accounting for
strategic choice that is based on two well established psychological traits of humans: delayed
gratification and theory of mind. It is shown that foresight is capable of overcoming the
notorious second-order free-rider effect, and thereby promotes cooperation. This is shown by
looking at a n-person public goods game and a simpler two-person interaction - developed
specifically to mimic the former game’s properties. Another explanation for why agents
cooperate with one another is that they do so because they are prone to making mistakes,
i.e. they possess a bounded rationality. While this is a logical explanation and there exists
machinery that accounts for error when predicting behavior (most notably quantal response
models) there exists no mathematical framework to investigate why humans developed this
bounded rationality. To address this gap in the literature I develop a model to inspect the
evolution of bounded rationality. By accounting for evolutionary pressures, e.g. metabolic
requirements of the brain, the possession of a bounded rationality in animals is explained.
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with the dominant at the bottom (purple) and the weakest at the top. Results
are the averages of 20 simulations using: b = 1.0, c = 0.5, β = 1, K = 2, E =
1 : 1, and E3 = 0.1.
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A.10 Effects of the expected benefit b, the group size N , and hierarchy steepness β
in the full model. The first column contains results for N = 4, the second for
N = 8, and the third for N = 16. The rows from top to bottom summarize the
effort levels X, the total payoffs Π, the relative payoffs π, the thresholds y, the
cost of punishing δ, the punishment inflicted p, and the punishment incurred q.
For each value of b, the bars (from left to right) correspond to β = 1, 2, 4. The
segments of each bar correspond to a particular individual with the dominant
at the bottom (purple) and the weakest at the top. Results are the averages
of 20 simulations using: c = 0.5, K = 2, λ = 40, E = 1 : 1, E3 = 0.1 and
ω = 0.50.
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B.1 The effects of the benefit b and the tax rate θ on the equilibrium frequencies
of production p∗ and inspection q ∗ in Cross’ reinforced learning process. Left
(a and c): foresight is absent. Right (b and d): foresight is present (with
ω = 0.5). Top (a and b): p∗ . Bottom (c and d): q ∗ . In each graph, the
clusters of bars correspond to b = 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5; within each cluster the bars
(from left to right) correspond to tax rate θ = 0.25, 0.50, 0.75. The error bars
denote the 95% confidence intervals. Simulations were run for 100,000 time
steps; 500 independent runs. Other parameters: c = 2, d = 2, h = 0.1, k = 1,
and λ = 4.
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B.2 The impact of foresight parameter ω on learning in Cross’ model in 500
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Chapter 1
Background, motivation and outline
1.1

Collective action problems: A primer

The story of the tower of Babel comes to us from our ancestors by way of the book of
Genesis. In it the people of the world come together to build a tower in the hopes of
reaching the heavens. God looking upon this splinters the men and women of the world
by confounding their speech. This is an origin story seeking to explain the many tongues
present in our diverse world. However, there is another lesson to be gleaned from this story.
Specifically, through cooperation there is no goal unobtainable, even the one of reaching
the heavens themselves. This should be evident to anyone by simply looking at all humans
have accomplished in our short time on earth. We have mastered fire, tamed wild beasts,
built cities that scrape the clouds, and even freed ourselves from the surly bonds of earth.
It is not a human that has done these things, but rather humankind. By working together
we have accomplished more than any other species before us. However, while cooperation
and coordination are most fully exemplified by homo sapiens, other species also display such
tendencies to work together to conquer the obstacles nature throws their way. This can be
seen in a pack of wolves working together to hunt their prey, a tribe of chimpanzees going
on patrol together against neighboring conspecifics, food sharing in bats, or alloparenting in
primates.
So a natural question one must ask is why and how do animals band together? At first
glance the answer seems simple, by working as a unit they increase that which they are
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capable of doing. Since this is true it is only logical that they would opt to work as a unit.
However, by this logic we would expect to see nothing short of full scale cooperation in all
animals at all times. If working together is so profitable, then why would any animal ever
opt to not cooperate with their peers? This is perhaps the better question - more succinctly
put as "When and why do animals sometimes fail to work together?" To answer this question
we must look at what motivates individual agents to first come together. When individuals
have interests that align with their groupmates, they are likely to associate with one another
in such a way as to further these interests. This association is what is referred to as an
organization. No matter the importance of an organization’s shared goals we must never
forget they are a collective comprised of many individuals and each of these individuals
carries with them the potential for a competing self-interest. As an example, we may think
of a pack of wolves on the hunt. Clearly, each wolf wants the pack to succeed in procuring
a meal, however, each individual wolf differs in their preferences of how that meal should be
split up. So while a shared goal brings individuals together their self-interests drive them
apart. These conflicting interests can give birth to what is known as a collective action
problem (CAP).
So how best should we approach the idea of a collective action problem. Well, collective
action problems begin with collective actions. In a collective action a group of individual
come together to achieve some result such as producing or acquiring some good or benefit.
Such collective actions typically produce what are known as public goods. By public good
we mean that the good or benefit is allotted - usually equally - to all members of the
collective. Examples include physical resources such as food and shelter, as well as more
ephemeral resources such as protection against predation. Now to obtain these public goods
the individuals must pay personal costs associated with the good production or acquisition.
In the example of food, this cost could be taking the time and energy necessary to spend
a day hunting. By allocating their resources towards the task of hunting the individual is
unable to spend them on other endeavors such as finding a mate and in this way pays a
personal cost. Now the clever individual may see that if they abstain from contributing
towards the public good, they will still by its very definition receive their share. In this way
they maximize their personal fitness by avoiding to pay any costs associated with and yet
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still reaping the rewards of the public good. This is known as the free-rider effect [89], as
individuals who employ such logic are free-riding on the efforts made by their groupmates.
While this may seem innocuous the free-rider effect poses a dire threat to group living. As
if every individual succumbs to this line reasoning, then the group will fail to produce the
public good and all individuals will be worse of because of it.
This paints a rather grim picture of the fate of cooperation. However, as aforementioned,
animals and people in particular succeed every day in cooperative living [125, 111, 19].
This gives rise to the question of "How are these supposedly self-interested agents capable of
banding together to achieve their common ends despite the presence of such strong deterrents
as the free-rider effect?" This has been and still is the center of much debate, and it is within
this debate that the current research resides. So how do we propose to investigate the
questions of cooperation? I will pursue the endeavor by standing on the shoulders of those
who have walked before me. In particular, we will be making use of game theory to attempt
to answer the question of how cooperation can be established and maintained.

1.2

How to model social interactions?

Game theory is a branch of mathematics tasked with modeling the interactions (cooperative
or competitive) between rational agents. It has been hugely impactful in the realm of
economics, and more recently biology. Before proceeding, it is necessary to establish some
jargon. In particular, we must discuss the components and the assumptions of game theory.
To have a game, you must have a set of players, a set of actions for each player, and a set of
payoffs associated with every possible outcome. For an example, we may consider a collective
action problem by looking at the linear public goods game played between n agents. Let
the individuals participating in the game be represented by variables x1 , x2 , . . . , xn . Each
individual will have the option to contribute (xi = 1) or not contribute (xi = 0) towards a
public good. Contributing towards the public good requires an individual to pay a personal
cost of c, and produces a benefit b which is then shared by the whole group. All that is left
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is to establish payoffs, which are given by
n

bX
πi =
xj − cxi
n j=1
as the total benefit produced by the group is given by b

Pn

j=1

xj and each individual gets an

equal share, thus the division by n, and each individual pays a personal cost of cxi . This
yields a game; however, we still can’t say anything about behavior because we have yet to
discuss the assumptions made on the agents. There are several different types of assumptions
that can be made about agents in game theory. For our purposes, we wish to only highlight
the assumption that agents are perfectly rational, i.e. all things equal they will choose their
strategies in such a way that it maximizes their payoffs. Let us now return to the above
example, and assume as is often the case that

b
n

< c, which is to say the net benefit of

contributing towards the public good is negative. Now if everyone in the group participates
in the production of the good, then each member of the group obtains b − c as a payoff.

However, if everyone but i contributes then then the payoff for i is given by b n−1
and the
n

rest of the group receives b n−1
− c each. Now the payoff to i is clearly larger than the
n
rest of the group. Thus all things equal, the payoff to an individual is always maximized by
them choosing to not contribute. Now if everyone follows this rationale and chooses to not
contribute, then the payoffs would all become 0, which is less than the payoff of b − c. This
is the very embodiment of the free-rider effect as discussed above.
Many great minds have wondered how in the face of such a devastatingly persuasive call
to non-action groups are able to not only obtain cooperation but maintain it. Some theories
that have been advanced are kin selection, direct and indirect reciprocity, punishment [73],
selective incentives and institutional designs [89, 90]. For the work contained herein we will be
focusing on the solutions of punishment and institutional design. Punishment, quite simply,
is the imposition of a penalty or the removal of a benefit in response to an offense or violation.
Both experimental [17, 90, 76, 29] and theoretical [107, 11, 13, 30, 81] work have shown that
punishment is an effective way to shape behavior. This means that punishment can alter a
groupmate’s behavior from non-cooperative to cooperative. Not only is punishment effective,
but it is also seen widely in nature and human society. So if punishment is such an effective
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route to solving CAP, then what is the problem? Naturally, individuals will not punish
themselves and so associated with punishment is the cost of punishing, which is the price
that must be paid in order to enforce the punishment. Therefore, who are the ones that must
bear the cost of punishing those who are non-cooperative? This produces a second CAP,
in the sense that individuals can either choose to enforce cooperative behavior by paying
for punishment or not enforce cooperative behavior by choosing to abstain from paying for
punishment. Clearly, the latter is cheaper and the enforcement of punishment is a public
good and so we have another free-rider problem this time referred to as the second-order
free-rider effect. Potential solutions that have been proposed include: meta-punishment
[12], conformism [51], signaling [44], and group selection [111, 11]. In this work, we will
be advancing a new solution to the second-order free-rider effect that we will refer to as
foresight.
Before defining what foresight is, we must give some background information. In classical
game theory agents are assumed to participate in one-shot games. However, in real life
individuals repeatedly interact in similar scenarios with others multiple times over the course
of their lifespans. As such the information that can be gained from examining one-shot games
is limited. Such iterated games can allow for much more complex strategies than their oneshot counterparts, as they can be based on past outcomes. From here we leave the classical
theory of games and enter into the theory of evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game
theory -founded by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price - is the application of game
theory to evolving populations. It most notably differs from traditional game theory in the
fact that all games are iterated and the focus of investigation is on how strategies change
or evolve over time. Questions of how cooperation can be established and maintained are
often approached using this framework, as one can take the biological traits evolving to be
cooperativeness of individuals. However, as its name suggests evolutionary game theory is
built upon Darwinian evolution concepts and is thus most relevant to biological traits. This
dissertation will address social not biological traits. By social traits, we mean traits that
are associated with the behavior of an agent such as cooperate and don’t cooperate. While
historically used to model social traits, the assumptions of evolutionary game theory that
traits are static over the course of one’s life, are inherited, and that agent’s have no agency
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to alter their traits in any meaningful way are not conducive to investigations dealing with
social traits. Hence, a new paradigm is needed to investigating these types of questions.
In this budding field, there are four major ways to account for the evolution - to use the
term loosely - of social traits: random mutation, myopic optimization, mimicry, and learning.
These mechanisms that seek to account for how individuals choose their strategies are known
as strategy update protocols [103]. So how important are these strategy update protocols?
This is a difficult question to answer, as at this time there exists no meta-analysis of these
different methods of accounting for agents’ rationality. However, one would suspect that
the assumptions made on how agents think about problems would be quite influential in
determining what solutions they arrive at. In this vein it is our claim that more realistic
strategy update protocols would serve as a solution to the second-order free-rider effect. The
method of strategy update that we will be advancing in this work is known as foresight.

1.3

Foresight: A new paradigm

Here we claim that foresight is a realistic strategy update protocol. In fact, foresight is based
on two principles that are firmly established in psychological, anthropology, and sociology
literature: delayed gratification and theory of mind. The first pillar of foresight, delayed
gratification, is something we all have experience in. The idea that one could forgo benefits
in the short-term in order to reap larger benefits in the long-term is not new. However, most
game theoretical models do not account for this line of reasoning. Myopic best response is
typically only concerned with optimizing the immediate payoff and completely disregards any
future payoffs that may be affected. Similarly, learning and mimicry look only to the past
when trying to predict the current values of strategies. Foresight in contrast is a balancing of
the current value of strategy with the value it is predicted to generate in future rounds. This
idea of an agent attempting to predict what will happen in future rounds brings us to our
second pillar of foresight. Theory of mind is the ability of an individual to attribute cognitive
processes to another individual. That is, having a theory of mind leads to the realization that
other individuals are capable of thought and reasoning. The presence of a theory of mind is
well established in humans, and emerging literature suggests it is present to some extent in
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animals as well. It is our assertion that this theory of mind is used by individuals to try and
predict how their groupmates will act in future rounds of interaction. This is done by asking
the question, "What would I do if I were in their shoes?" In this way individuals can not
only evaluate the payoff of a strategy in this current round, but also evaluate the benefits it
is likely to produce in future interactions. As Erving Goffman surmised when an individual
meets others for the first time, they often seek to derive information regarding his “general
socio-economic status, his conception of self, his attitude toward them, his competence,
his trust worthiness, etc.” This is done “as a means of predicting his present and future
behaviour” [47].
If we return to the example of the linear public goods game outlined above we can see
how this can come into play. Suppose there are three individuals (call them A, B and C)
participating in our linear public goods, and they each have the option of punishing noncooperators for a certain fee. Suppose that A and B cooperate, while C opts to withhold
cooperation. A and B are now faced with the choice of whether C should be punished. In
typical models the choice is simple, punishing C will do nothing other than their own payoff
and hence they should opt to ignore their transgression. If, however, A or B posses foresight
then he or she may be willing to pay the cost of punishing C this round knowing that by
doing so they will change their behavior in subsequent rounds out of fear of retribution. In
this way A and B balance the payoff in this current round with the predicted payoffs in
future rounds of interactions.
It is worthwhile to note the literature on indirect reciprocity and reputation [85? ,
28], which has been adapted to address the second-order free-rider problem [94]. In this
work foresight is present in a sense as individuals use a reputation score to judge whether
to cooperate with an individual. In this sense, past information is used to inform future
decisions. Our notion of foresight is based upon a theory of mind, which this literature fails
to account for. For this reason we assert that our approach is more realistic (especially when
considering humans).
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1.4

Looking ahead

This dissertation is broken up into five chapters. The first of which - the one you are reading
- introduces some key background and motivations as well as outlines the shape of the rest
of the dissertation. In Chapter 2, we investigate the question of whether cooperation can
be established in a heterogeneous group capable of punishing non-cooperators. We find that
using the standard strategy update protocol of myopic optimization, the second-order freerider effect halts the establishment of cooperation. However, when our notion of foresight is
used the outcome changes significantly. In particular, we see that once capable of foresight
the agents develop an impromptu division of labor where the strongest individual focuses
on enforcing cooperation while the rest of the group is tasked with producing the public
good. Having established that not only does foresight overcome the second-order free-rider
problem but that it induces a division of labor we move on to Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, we
develop a 2x2 game played between a leader and subordinate. The reduction in difficulty
allows us to obtain analytical results. The structural heterogeneity is justified by the fact
that foresight induces leadership in heterogeneous groups as established in Chapter 2. We
perform analysis on several different strategy update protocols, and find that in terms of
ability to foster leadership and contribution and maximizing group benefit foresight is the
best. Switching gears in Chapter 4, we explore the notion of precision. More precisely we
attempt to investigate how evolutionary pressures may have shaped the level of precision we
see in humans and animals today and how this in turn dictated the propensity to cooperate
in CAPs.
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Chapter 2
CAP in heterogeneous groups with
punishment and foresight
2.1

Introduction

Working as a group can be highly profitable due to economy of scale. However, there are
several obstacles that must be overcome in order to obtain such a benefit. For example, group
members have to be able to effectively coordinate their actions, resolve potential conflicts,
and minimize free-riding. Within-group free-riding (which often comes under a rubric of
“collective action problem”, Olson 89) can undermine cooperation whenever individual effort
is costly and individuals can benefit from the effort of their group-mates. In this case, all
individuals are faced with the temptation to reduce or eliminate their efforts. However, if
a substantial proportion of group members follow this logic, the group benefit will not be
produced and everybody will suffer. Collective action problem is common in many animal
and human groups [89, 86, 52, 43, 10, 91, 36, 127]. Nevertheless, cooperation in groups
is widespread [125, 111, 19]. Understanding its origins and maintenance is viewed as a
fundamental challenge in the fields of both social and biological sciences [89, 86, 52, 18, 43,
10, 91].
Accordingly, an extensive body of work exists that explores the different mechanisms
capable of promoting and maintaining cooperation. Classical work in economics emphasizes
selective incentives (i.e., benefits and punishment) as well as institutional design as solutions
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to collective action problems [89, 115, 91]. More recent work in evolutionary biology focuses
on kin selection, direct and indirect reciprocity, group selection and also punishment [73,
10]. Adding to this list is a body of literature which explores the influence of within-group
heterogeneity [2, 25, 31, 74, 38, 36]. Intuition suggests, and experimental work has shown,
that the costs and benefits of cooperation affect participants’ willingness to contribute to
a collective good. Additionally, the presence of influential individuals [130, 128, 40] and
differences in the cost of punishing [25, 22] can each result in cooperation being more easily
established and maintained because some individuals may be more willing to contribute
than others. These findings suggest that in addition to being more realistic, the inclusion of
within-group heterogeneity is key to understanding how groups cooperate.
Our primary goal here is to extend recent theoretical work on voluntary provisioning of
collective goods in heterogeneous groups [38, 36] for the case when individuals can punish
free-riders. Mathematical models have already shown that punishing can be an effective tool
for promoting the evolution of cooperation [107, 11, 13, 30, 81]. This conclusion is supported
by experimental studies on cooperative behavior in both humans [90, 29] and non-human
animals [17, 76]. Despite this work, the motivations behind why any one individual would
choose to punish remains a source of much debate. While punishment may discourage the
future selfish behavior of others, it comes with a personal price as the act of administering
punishment requires some expenditure of effort. For this reason, it is more beneficial to
abstain from punishing in the same way it can be to abstain from contributing to production
of a collective good, resulting in a second-order free-rider problem. Proposed solutions to
this second- (and higher-) order free-rider problem include meta-punishment [12], conformism
[51], signaling [109, 44] and group-selection [111, 42, 11].
Below, we offer a different solution to the second-order free-rider problem. It is motivated
by the idea that individuals often punish others in order to modify their future behavior [21].
This is also known as deterrence theory (see Nagin 80 for a review) and utilizes what [5]
referred to as “the shadow of the future.” Examples of such punishment abound in modern
society, from penal systems to the grounding of one’s child. In line with this, laboratory
experiments have shown that individuals view punishment and the threat of punishment
as way to deter future bad behavior [123, 122, 27, 21]. For example, in an experiment
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performed by [66], participants played a trust game with a partner, who could cooperate or
defect. Following this initial decision, participants could punish partners who had defected.
Then participants played another round of the trust game with the same partner. Results
show that participants were equally trusting of both partners who had previously cooperated
and those who had been punished following defection [66]. The participants’ willingness to
trust those who had been punished indicates their belief that the act of punishing would be
effective at preventing future selfish behavior.
The understanding that others will change their actions in response to one’s own actions is
a consequence of humans’ “theory of mind”. The latter refers to the ability to reason about
the knowledge and thought processes of others and is a well established trait in humans
[98, 116], and recently was even suggested in chimpanzees [14, 67]. Humans can also use
the theory of mind recursively [96, 49], which entails thinking about how others think about
you. This ability is thought to be key in promoting cooperation within groups [116].
Here, we develop and study an agent-based model in which individuals both value future
payoffs and are aware of their influence over their group-mates’ future actions. We seek to
explore the effects such cognitive capabilities have on cooperation in groups facing a collective
action problem. Our results suggest that the capability to anticipate future actions of groupmates (i.e. foresight) results in a higher willingness to enforce cooperation via punishment.
Hence, foresight effectively provides a solution to the second-order free-rider problem that
does not depend on meta-punishment, signaling, or conformism. While foresight increases
cooperation, the ability of foresight does not necessarily lead to higher payoffs. We also show
that within-group heterogeneity results in an impromptu division of labor where dominant
individuals take charge of punishment and others are forced to focus on contributing to the
public good production.

2.2

The basic model

For the benefit of the reader all important parameters and variables have been collected in
Table 2.1 along with their interpretations.
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Table 2.1: Summary of parameters and variables used in Chapter 2.
Parameter/Variable
G
N
xij
c
Xj
Pj
X0
f0
B̃
πij
E1
E2
E3
K
λ
vi
β
yi j
si k
ω

Interpretation
Number of groups participating in CAP
Group size
The jth ’s group’s ith members level of contribution
Cost associated with contributing toward CAP
jth group’s total effort
Probability of success in the CAP
Half-success effort in “us vs nature” CAP
Baseline fitness
Benefit associated with CAP
Relative payoff of group j’s member i
Probability group participates in “us vs nature” event
Probability group participates in “us vs them” event
Probability group participates in cultural group selection event
Number of candidate strategies generated
Precision parameter
i’s valuation of the CAP’s good
Steepness of hierarchy
Group j’s member i’s punishment threshold
Group j’s member i’s strength level
Emphasis on future payoffs
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2.2.1

No punishment and no foresight

We will use a common framework for studying collective action [38, 36, 35, 39, 124]. We
consider a population of individuals living in a large collection of G groups, each with fixed
size N . These groups are engaged in collective actions, potentially affecting both individual
and group survival and reproduction. Such a set-up results in multi-level selection pressures
at both the within- and between-group levels. Pressures at the between-group level encourage
individuals to make large contributions, while at the within-group level there is a strong
incentive for individuals to free-ride. We allow for groups to be either egalitarian, so that all
individuals receive an equal share of produced goods, or hierarchical, so that each individual’s
share depends on their rank (or strength). The group sizes that we will be considering are
N = 4, 8, and 16, which cover the range of the number of adult males observed in chimpanzees
and extant hunter-gatherer groups [53, 95].
Collective actions. We consider two types of collective action [35, 36].The first type
focuses on group activities such as hunting and gathering, defense from predators and,
building/maintaining shelter. The success of an individual group in these activities is largely
unaffected by the action of neighboring groups. For this reason, we refer to these actions as
“us vs nature” games. In contrast, limited space, resources, and mating opportunities can
result in competition between groups of conspecifics. This means that as the efforts of one
group rises (ceteris paribus), the resources available to neighboring groups decrease. Since
the success of a particular group depends upon the actions of its neighbors we refer such
games as “us vs them”. Mathematically, in “us vs nature” actions, group members participate
in a generalized public goods game. In “us vs them” actions, two groups compete in a contest
[65, 101] over a resource. The key distinction between these two types of collective action is
that in the former the absolute group effort is critical for obtaining resources, while in the
latter it is the group effort relative to that of the other competing group that matters.
Let xi,j be a nonnegative number representing the effort expended by individual i in group
j. This contribution comes at a personal cost of cxi,j , where c is a constant parameter, that
is, we assume the cost grows linearly with the effort. The combined efforts of the group
P
members, i.e., the impact function, is Xj = i xi,j . In “us vs nature” games, the maximum
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available benefit is B and the share obtained by group j is defined as
Pj =

Xj
,
Xj + X0

(2.1)

where X0 is the half-success effort, i.e. the group proficiency required for Pj = 50%. We
note that the probability of success tends asymptotically towards 1 as the group effort goes
to infinity. Additionally for larger X0 , the more group effort is required to secure the reward.
For example, when a resource is abundant, less effort (resulting from fewer contributors or
smaller average contribution) would be required to obtain a sufficient amount. However,
when a resource is rare, a larger expenditure of effort may be necessary to successfully seek
it out.
In “us vs them” games, the maximum available benefit is 2B, and the share won by group
j when in competition with group k is
Pj =

Xj
.
Xj + Xk

(2.2)

This can also be interpreted as the proportion of fights where group j is able to beat group
k.
Individual payoffs. Individual payoffs are defined as
Πij = f0 + B̃Pj vi − cxij ,

(2.3)

where f0 is the baseline fitness, which can be assumed to be 1, B̃ = B in “us vs nature”
games and B̃ = 2B in “us vs them” games, and vi is the proportion of the reward allotted to
individual i (or its valuation). We implement two values of B̃ so that the expected benefit
per group is the same for both types of events. In egalitarian groups, everybody gets an equal
share, vi = 1/n. We will also consider heterogeneous groups in which individuals will differ
in vi . It is useful to define the term b = B/n, which is the expected benefit per individual in
an egalitarian group playing an “us vs them” game against a group making an equally strong
P
effort. In presenting our results, we will use the relative payoffs πig = Πig / j Πjg .
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Events. To increase the realism of our models, we formulate them in continuous time
and model social dynamics using an event-driven approach [41]. [We note also that the more
commonly used synchronous updating may result in some spurious effects (e.g. cycling)
which is not desirable.] There are three types of events. At each step, with probability E1
a randomly chosen group participates in an “us vs. nature” game, while with probability
E2 a randomly chosen pair of groups participate in an “us vs. them” game. Lastly, with
probability E3 a randomly chosen poorly performing group copies the strategies of another
randomly chosen, but well-performing group. When such a “cultural group selection” [100]
event occurs, the chances to be chosen to copy another group are proportional to e−Pj and
those of being copied are proportional to ePj . We treat probabilities E1 , E2 , and E3 as
exogenously specified constants. Naturally, E1 + E2 + E3 = 1. It will be useful to define
the ratio E = E1 : E2 of the frequencies of “us vs. nature” to “us vs. them” games (which
we will refer to as the “game frequencies ratio”) for when we begin to explore the effects the
frequencies of these events have on group dynamics.
Strategy revision.

To increase the realism of our models, we also assume that our

individuals are bounded rational (rather than, say, hard-wired genetically to behave in a
particular way). After both “us vs nature” and “us vs them” events, each member of the
affected group(s) independently updates their strategies with probability µ. We start by
using myopic optimization (best response) with a finite number of “candidate strategies”.
[We note that myopic optimization and genetic selection often lead to very similar equilibria
(e.g., if the underlying game is potential [54, 129].)] For example, assume that the action
taken by individual i was contributing effort xi,0 to a collective action. Candidate strategies
are randomly and independently drawn from a normal distribution centered at an individual’s
current strategy xi,0 and with a standard deviation of σ. We draw K new “candidate
strategies” xi,1 , . . . , xi,K and then evaluate the associated K + 1 expected payoffs Πi,k
(including the payoff for the original xi,0 strategy), assuming that all other individuals keep
their strategies from the prior round. That is, members of groups that just played consider
how each of their candidate strategies would have fared in the event that just took place.
Being able to assess this requires each individual to know their own effort as well as the total
effort of their group (and of the competing group).
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From these K + 1 strategies, individual i will choose one at random with probabilities
proportional to eλΠi,k , where λ is a parameter measuring the precision in evaluating the
payoffs. Increasing λ increases the probability that a candidate strategy with the highest
payoffs is chosen. This approach is a version of the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE)
developed in the field of economics and serves as a way to incorporate mistakes players
make when comparing potential strategies [75, 46]. In our models, the standard deviation
in the candidate strategies’ expected payoffs is relatively small, which necessitates the use
of relatively large λ values. In particular, we consider such values as λ = 10, 20, 40, 80. In
order to gain additional insight, we also examine the case when λ = ∞, which corresponds
to when agents make no errors always choosing myopically the best strategy available to
them.
To study our model we use agent-based simulations (more details are provided in
Appendix A). Although similar to that in [38] and [36], our approach differs in several
important aspects. First, we assume that events happen asynchronously. Second, we allow
for groups to play both types of games rather than a single type of game. Our approach
introduces new parameters - the frequencies of different events E1 , E2 and E3 . Third, we
focus on evolution by myopic optimization instead of genetic evolution. This means that
strategies do not evolve as a consequence of random mutation and natural selection, but
rather individuals choose strategies attempting to maximize their payoffs. Our approach
also introduces parameters λ, agents’ precision in evaluating potential payoffs, and K, the
number of new candidate strategies considered.
Results for egalitarian groups. First we describe what happens in the case of equal division
of the group reward. From earlier work focusing on games of one type only, we know that
in “us vs. them” games, the equilibrium group contribution is X ∗ = b/(2c) and is always
√
positive. In “us vs. nature” games, X ∗ = X0 ( R − 1), where R = b/(cX0 ), so that X ∗ is
positive only if the benefit-to-cost ratio R is big enough [38, 35, 36]. Here to better elucidate
the impact of the parameters E, λ, and K we have chosen the values of b, c and X0 so that
contributions are always positive (see the Appendix A for more results). All graphs below
report the average values evaluated over a certain number of time steps at the end of the
simulations.
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Figure 1 illustrates the effects on the total group effort X of precision λ and additional
parameters. [Note the meaning of each color differs between the rows.] In this Figure, the
graphs (from left to right) correspond to the cases of λ = ∞, 40, 10 meaning the precision
in evaluating payoffs decreases as we move to the right. We see that decreasing precision
results in increased contributions. This happens because errors in strategy evaluation bias
individual contributions towards over-production (due to the fact that negative contributions
are not possible). We also see moderate increases in the total group effort in response to
group size N . This is because in larger groups, more individuals make errors. The first row
of graphs in Figure 2.1 shows that increasing the frequency of “us vs. them” events (specified
by the game frequency ratio E) increases the total group effort. This is in line with previous
findings [35, 36]. The second row of graphs in Figure 2.1 shows that the frequency of cultural
group selection events E3 affects the efforts only for small λ but the overall effects are small.
This implies that in this model, the effects of cultural group selection on cooperation are
insignificant.
The third row of graphs in Figure 2.1 illustrates the impact of the number of candidate
strategies K. When individuals are imprecise (λ < ∞) we see that K has a nonlinear effect:
increasing K increases the group effort with small errors (λ = 40) but decreases it with
large errors (λ = 10). The case when individuals make no errors (λ = ∞) is more nuanced
and depends upon the games frequencies ratio E. When groups only participate in “us vs.
nature” games (E = 1 : 0), we see that K has no effect. This is to be expected as “best
responders” are expected to converge on the optimal contribution regardless of how many
candidate strategies they evaluate. However, when competition with neighboring groups is
introduced, increasing K unexpectedly increases group efforts. The intuition behind this
effect is that with groups constantly facing different opponents, “fine tuning” of individual
behavior within each group (expected with large K) prevents convergence to an equilibrium.
As a result, the system exhibits nonlinear dynamics (see Figs. A.2 and A.3 in the appendix).
Results with within-group heterogeneity. In real life, individuals are not identical in their
strengths and abilities and this heterogeneity impacts social behavior. For example, stronger
individuals can grab a large share of the reward or can make larger efforts because it costs
them less. In our model, we postulate that group members differ in their strength si . An
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Figure 2.1: Group efforts X in the egalitarian case as influenced by group size N , the
precision parameter λ, the game frequencies ratio E (first row of graphs, with E3 = 0.1, K =
2), the frequency E3 of cultural group selection events (second row of graphs, with N =
8, K = 2), and the number of candidate strategies K (third row of graphs, with E = 1 :
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Figure 2.2: Effects of group size N , the precision parameter λ, and the game frequencies
ratio E on the group efforts X and relative payoffs π of individuals of different ranks in
the basic hierarchical model.For each group size, the bars (from left to right) correspond
to E = 1 : 0, 3 : 1, 1 : 1, 1 : 3, 0 : 1. The segments of each bar correspond to a particular
individual with the strongest at the bottom (purple) and the weakest at the top. Results are
the averages of 20 simulations using: b = 1.0, β = 1.0, c = 0.5, X0 = 1, K = 2 and E3 = 0.1.
individual’s strength is a constant assigned by drawing a random number from the uniform
distribution over [0, 1]. We rank individuals according to their strengths. Following [38], we
set individual shares vi (or valuations of the reward) based on their relative strengths:
sβ
vi = P i β ,
k sk

(2.4)

where parameter β determines the steepness of the hierarchy, i.e. the degree of inequality
within the group [38]. Note if β = 0, then all shares are identical (as in the egalitarian case
above), but if β > 1 stronger individuals obtain disproportionately larger shares of resources.
Figure 2.2 is analogous to the first row of Figure 2.1 but now we show efforts of individuals
of different ranks (averaged across all groups) as well as their relative payoffs πi (i.e. shares
of the reward) using different colors (the strongest individuals are at the bottom of each
column). We see that heterogeneity results in the most dominant individual contributing
almost all of the effort while the rest of the group free-rides. The severity to which the
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rest of the group free-rides off of the efforts of the dominant individual increases in response
to increased precision λ. This pattern is expected as more rational subordinate individuals
would seek to fully capitalize on the dominant individual’s willingness to contribute. This is
an example of Olson’s (1965) “exploitation of the great by the small”. In some cases, the most
dominant individual ends up with a smaller payoff then one or more of its subordinates in
spite of receiving the biggest share of the reward, a pattern named an “altruistic bully”
effect [38]. This can happen regardless of the group size N or precision parameter λ.
Contributions by the dominant are driven by competition with other groups since increases
in the frequency E of “us vs them” events increase efforts in all cases. Decreasing precision
λ increases individual contributions of non-dominant individuals who now contribute to
collective action by mistake (see also Fig A.4 in the SI). In contrast, with higher precisions
dominant individuals bear an even larger share of the group’s burden (Fig. 2.2a,b,c). The
total group effort does not depends on the group size when precision parameter λ is large
and weakly increases with low λ as more individuals contribute by error in larger groups.
Increasing the number of candidate strategies K results in individuals contributing less effort
towards the common good (Figure A.5 in the SI). The effects of the frequency E3 of cultural
group selection events in the hierarchical model are similar to those in the egalitarian case
and small (see Fig. A.6 in the SI).
Figure 2.3 focuses on the effects of benefit b and the parameter β, which measures the
steepness of a group’s hierarchy, i.e. the inequality present amongst group-mates. We
see increasing inequality β results in increasing total group effort [38, 36] with dominant
individuals contributing most of it.

2.2.2

Incorporating punishment

Next we add the possibility of punishment. We utilize graduated punishment [106, 59, 34,
50]) as it represents the most appropriate approach for dealing with continuous production
efforts (rather than discrete). Specifically, we postulate that each individual has an evolving
“punishment threshold” trait yi and is motivated to punish any other group-mate whose

20

λ=∞

Efforts (X)

8
4

Relative Payoffs (π)

0

λ=40

8
4

b=.5

1
(a)

2

0

4

b=.5

1
(b)

2

0

1

1

1

0.5

0.5

0.5

0

b=.5

1
(d)

2

0

λ=10

8

b=.5

1
(e)

2

0

b=.5

1
(c)

2

b=.5

1
(f)

2

Figure 2.3: Effects of the average benefit b, the precision parameter λ, and the hierarchy
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effort xj is smaller than yi . If individual i punishes individual j, j’s payoff is reduced by
κij = e(yi − xj ),

(2.5)

where e > 0 is a scaling parameter. That is, the smaller the effort xj of j relative to the
punishment threshold yi of i, the larger the cost κij . We assume the act of punishing others
is costly. We denote the corresponding payoff loss to i as δij .
In standard models of graduated punishment, any individual can punish any other
individual. In real life however, individuals vary greatly in their strengths and capabilities,
and while strong individuals can often easily punish weak individuals, punishment of the
strong by the weak is unlikely. To capture this idea, we assume that individual i is willing
to punish individual j only if
si > sj + ξ,

(2.6)

where ξ is a random number from a normal distribution with zero mean and standard
deviation . One way to interpret this model is that i is willing to punish j only if i believes
it is stronger than j with ξ being the error in evaluating relative strengths.
Moreover, we postulate that the cost to punisher i depends on the severity of punishment
κij and the difference in strengths, si − sj :
δij = κij Sij ,

(2.7)

Sij = S0 exp[φ(sj − si )].

(2.8)

where

Here S0 is the baseline factor of punishing (equal to the cost of punishing an individual equal
in strength) and φ is a scaling parameter (the larger φ, the faster the cost to i declines with
the difference in strengths). This formulation implies that punishing of the weak by the
strong is relatively cheap.
In this extension of our basic model, each individual is characterized by a pair of
strategies (xi , yi ) specifying their contribution to the collective action and punishment
threshold. Correspondingly, in updating individual strategies, agents will consider K pairs of
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randomly generated candidate strategies (xi,1 , yi,1 ), . . . , (xi,K , yi,K ) plus the original strategy
pair (xi , yi ), and select one of them with probabilities proportional to their expected payoffs
as we had done previously in Section 2.1.
Our numerical results for this model show that punishment can happen only by error
when individuals have low levels of precision λ (see below). This makes sense because of
the second-order free-riding discussed above. Punishment due to error is a tenuous route to
overcoming the second-order free-rider problem. Instead of depending on agents mistakenly
enforcing cooperation as a result of their inability to differentiate the best payoff, we seek to
develop an explanation for how both imprecise and precise agents can overcome the secondorder free-rider problem. We accomplish this through the next addition to our model, which
will incentivize agents to enforce cooperation despite the costs.

2.3
2.3.1

The model with foresight
Strategy revision with foresight

We now extend our strategy revision protocol to make use of foresight. Let (x0i , yi0 ) be a
(1)

candidate strategy of i. Let Πi

be the expected payoff to i at the next collective action

if i chooses (x0i , yi0 ) while all its group-mates keep their current strategies. Individual i may
expect that its group-mate j will chose a new strategy (x̃j , ỹj ) in response to i using (x0i , yi0 ).
(2)

Predicting these strategies for all group-mates allows i to estimate the expected payoff Πi

at the collective action two steps forward. In the standard myopic optimization (or the “best
(1)

response” approach) which we have used so far, i attempts to maximize Πi . In contrast, we
will now postulate myopic optimization with one-step foresight where i attempts to maximize
the utility function
(1)

(2)

Πf = (1 − ω)Πi + ωΠi ,

(2.9)

where the foresight parameter 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1 measures the weight of the future payoff in the
utility function. We note that predicting how group-mates will react to a change in one’s
strategy should not be too difficult cognitively. Basically, one just has to answer the simple
question “what would I do if I were in their place?” In numerical implementation, i generates
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K + 1 pairs of candidate strategies for each j and attempts to picks the best one from the
j’s perspective. The actual choice happens with probabilities proportional to exp(λΠf ) as
before.
Note that in our implementation, individuals only seek to predict their potential influence
over members of their own group. In particular, agents that participate in “us vs them”
events do not attempt to predict how the opposing group’s agents will alter their future
behavior. This is a reasonable assumption because of the lack of familiarity between members
of different groups, and the fact that the two groups are not guaranteed to interact again.

2.3.2

Results for the model with foresight

We begin our investigation of the full model by first considering the effects of the foresight
parameter ω and the game frequency ratio E on individual and group behavior. Figure 2.4
illustrates these effects for groups with perfect precision (λ = ∞, first row) and imperfect
precision (λ = 40, second row). In addition to the efforts and relative payoffs, we now show
the payoff loss due to being punished (labeled “punishment incurred” q in the graphs) and
the payoff lost by other individuals due to the punishment by the focal individual (labeled
“punishment inflicted” p in the graphs). Formally, for individual i, the punishment incurred
P
P
qi = j κki while the punishment inflicted pi = j κik . (See the SI for figures summarizing
punishment thresholds yi and the costs of punishing others δij .)
The case of ω = 0 corresponds to cooperation and punishment in groups without foresight
as discussed above. In this case, most of the group effort is delivered by the most dominant
individual and punishment happens only by error. We see foresight significantly increases
the total group effort and that this happens in spite of the most dominant individuals
greatly decreasing their efforts (Figure 2.4a,e). Rather than contributing to production of the
collective goods, the dominant individuals dramatically increase punishment delivering most
of it (Figure 2.4c,g). Punishment is mostly directed towards weak individuals (Figure 2.4d,h)
who greatly increase their contributions (Figure 2.4a,e).

As a result of these factors,

dominant individuals increase their payoffs at the expense of subordinates (Figure 2.4b,f).
Our results thus suggest that foresight does indeed provide a viable route to overcoming the
second-order free-rider problem.
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Figure 2.4: Effects of the foresight parameter ω and the game frequencies ratio E on
the group efforts X and relative payoffs π, the punishment inflicted p, and the punishment
incurred q for individuals of different ranks in the full model with perfect (λ = ∞, first
row) and imperfect (λ = 40, second row) precision. For each value of ω, the bars (from left
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Results are the averages of 20 simulations using: N = 8, b = 1.0, c = 0.5, β = 1, K = 2 and
E3 = 0.10.
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In general, dominant individuals make lower contributions and obtain larger proportions
of the reward than their group-mates, but these asymmetries are lessened as group size
increases (see the SI). In all cases, foresight greatly increases the efforts of subordinate group
members (Figures 2.4a,e) because of increased punishment of free-riders. Foresight results
in dominant members severely decreasing their contributions toward production because
punishing is cheaper to these individuals, and hence it is easier to increase their group’s
total output by promoting cooperation of others than it is to do so by increasing their own
contributions. This results in a division of labor, where the dominant individual focuses on
promoting cooperation through punishment while the rest of the group contributes to the
common good. In this way the dominate individual acts as a coercive leader for the group.
As in the basic model, we see that increased competition with other groups (i.e. increased
E) results in a higher group efforts. However, because of the aforementioned reasons, these
increases are not due to the dominant individual contributing more, but instead a result
of cooperation being more strictly enforced (Figure 2.4a,c and e,g). Hence, the extent of a
group’s division of labor is driven by both the emphasis its members place on future payoffs
and the amount of competition they face from other groups. These results imply that the
emergence of a coercive leader would be more likely in rational groups that commonly engage
in conflicts with neighboring groups.
Another factor that determines the extent of the division of labor is the number of
candidate strategies generated, K. Figure 2.5 shows that for the case of N = 8 as the number
of candidate strategies an individual considers grows, dominate individuals contribute less
and punish more (see the SI for additional numerical results). The fact that the extent of the
observed division of labor increases with the number K of candidate strategies considered
implies that the option to develop such a division is payoff-maximizing.
Figure 2.6 provides additional information on the effects of different parameters with
ω = 0.5 and λ = 40. The first row of graphs in this figure explores the effects on the
game frequencies ratio E and the frequency of cultural group selection events E3 . Increasing
E increases both contributions and punishment. Effects of E3 are somewhat similar but
relatively small. We see that weaker individuals increase their contributions towards the
group’s good because dominant individuals punish more with increasing E3 . The second
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Figure 2.5: Effects of the foresight parameter ω and the number of candidate strategies K
on the group efforts X and relative payoffs π, the punishment inflicted p, and the punishment
incurred q for individuals of different ranks in the full model with perfect (λ = ∞, first
row) and imperfect (λ = 40, second row) precision. For each value of ω, the bars (from
left to right) correspond to the number of candidate strategies generated K = 1, 2, 4. The
segments of each bar correspond to a particular individual with the dominant at the bottom
(purple) and the weakest at the top. Results are the averages of 20 simulations using:
N = 8, b = 1.0, c = 0.5, E = 1 : 1, and E3 = 0.1.
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row of graphs in Figure 2.6 illustrates the effects of the group size N . We see that increasing
N increases the amount of payoff spent on punishment and also decreases the payoff of
dominant individuals. Our results correspond to the well-established fact that group cohesion
is more difficult to maintain as group sizes increase. The third row of graphs in Figure 2.6
explores the effects on the benefit b and the hierarchy steepness β. Increasing either of these
parameters increases punishment and contributions as expected.
Figures A.8-A.10 in the SI provide additional numerical results. Among other things
they show that although foresight increases production of collective goods, its effect on the
absolute payoffs Π can be negative (due to the costs of punishment).

2.4

Discussion

Here we have studied the impact of punishment and foresight on the ability of heterogeneous
groups to overcome collective action problems. The latter seriously undermine cooperation
across a wide range of situations in many animal and human groups as demonstrated by
numerous studies in primatology [86, 87, 64, 20, 126, 127], behavioral biology [93, 7, 68, 69],
anthropology [48, 15, 45, 16, 71, 72], and economics [89, 115, 91]. Earlier work has shown that
within-group heterogeneity and inequality can, under some conditions, increase the group’s
productivity as dominant or stronger individuals make larger effort overcompensating freeriding of subordinate or weak group-mates [38, 36]. Earlier work has also established that
punishment is a powerful force for the maintenance of cooperation [107, 30, 11, 13, 81].
However the role of punishment in the origin of cooperation is less clear, partially because
of the second-order free-rider problem [12, 51].
Earlier models were studied under the assumption that strategies are modified by either
random “mutation”, selective copying, or myopic optimization [103]. The novel element of
our approach is that we allow for a one-step foresight where players, first, care about their
future payoff and, second, attempt to account for how their group-mates will react to their
new strategies.
Our main result is that inclusion of a limited foresight dramatically changes groups’
social dynamics. First, foresight provides a route to overcoming the second-order free-rider
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problem as punishment gets established and hence cooperation increases. This is a robust
result, which is not expected to crucially depend on modeling details such as the presence
of heterogeneity in strengths or the specific form of punishment used. Second, foresight can
result in a division of labor in which more dominant or stronger individuals specialize in
enforcing cooperation through punishment while the rest of the group focuses on production
of collective goods. Lastly, this route to promoting cooperation works for a wide range of the
number of candidate strategies K and precision λ. The potency of this new method of strategy
revision was made clear by the examining the effect of the parameter ω, which measures the
emphasis individuals place on forecasted payoffs. We saw that as the importance of future
payoffs increased, individuals became more willing to punish uncooperative group-mates
and the extent of the division of labor deepened. While previous agent-based simulations
have shown that possessing theory of mind is beneficial when participating in dyadic games
[23, 24], our work serves as one of the first steps towards understanding how it affects behavior
in a group setting. Our findings suggest that a theory of mind is an important aspect of how
groups are able to solve collective action problems.
Our approach for making predictions of how group-mates will act is related to the socalled “level-k models” [112, 79]. The latter assume players adhere to a particular model
of reasoning which forms a hierarchy. At the bottom are those individuals who change
their behavior completely randomly, referred to as level-0 types. If a player assumes all
others adhere to level-0 reasoning and adapt his or her behavior accordingly, then they are
categorized as level-1 type. Similarly, a level-2 type believes all others to be either level-0 or
level-1. These levels of reasoning continue indefinitely. In our model, level-0 individuals do
not change their strategies and level-1 types use standard myopic optimization. Our limited
foresight updating then corresponds to level-2 reasoning types as they consider how others
will react to their actions. This assumption is both quite natural and not too taxing on the
players’ cognitive abilities.
Here, our groups were faced with both “us vs nature” events in which a single group
was faced with the task of producing a collective good, and “us vs them” events which
saw two groups competing over goods. We saw that the type of collective action a group
was participating in greatly affected the strategies group members chose. In particular,
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we saw that both production and punishment rose in response to the frequency of “us vs
them” events as observed earlier [35, 36]. Cooperation and punishment also increased with
increasing the intensity of cultural group selection (measured in our model by parameter
E3 ) but the overall effect was small. Our models show that groups of rational self-interested
individuals capable of limited foresight can converge on cooperative solutions even without
cultural group selection (c.f. Singh et al. 108). Such a convergence will also happen much
faster than if by cultural group selection as it does not require information exchange between
groups.
The division of labor observed in our simulations is a result of the heterogeneity of
our groups. Individuals in our model were assumed to differ in strengths, which impacted
their shares of the reward, ability to punish others, and resiliency against punishments.
These differences resulted in dominant or stronger individuals being able to more easily exert
influence over their peers through punishment. The inability to efficiently retaliate against
the punishment inflicted by the strong left the weaker group members with no choice but
to increase their production efforts. [Otherwise, retaliation can easily destroy cooperation
[83].] Hence, through the use of the threat of punishment, dominant individuals were able
to enforce cooperation within their groups. Since the dominant individuals did not fear
being punished and maintained cooperation largely through the threat of punishment alone,
we saw them have disproportionately large payoffs. While the models without punishment
predict “exploitation of the great by the small” [89, 38, 36], those with punishment depict
“the exploitation of the small by the great”.
Of particular interest are the trends noted in the payoffs of individuals.

We saw

that foresight coupled with heterogeneity resulted in dominant individuals reaping larger
shares of rewards.

The benefit to the strong provided by an ability of foresight was

shown to be undermined by larger group sizes. Dominant individuals’ share of the payoffs
also increased when “us vs them” events became more common, the number of candidate
strategies increased, or agents became more precise in their strategy selection. Also as one
would expect, dominant individuals obtained larger portions of the groups’ benefits when
hierarchies were steeper.
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The emergence of a division of labor was shown to be highly sensitive to group size.
Increases in group size resulted in individuals being less prone to punish group-mates. This
in turn resulted in decreases in group efforts and in payoffs being more evenly distributed
(since it was no longer cost effective for dominant individuals to specialize in enforcing
cooperation).
Two additional parameters of our models the expected benefit b and the hierarchy
steepness β. As one would expect, increases in b resulted in increased efforts and punishment
thresholds. While in the basic model without foresight increasing β resulted in the efforts
of dominant individuals rising while their relative payoffs decreased, in the full model we
observed increases in both the dominant individuals’ thresholds and relative payoffs. Hence,
the presence of foresight effectively removed the “altruistic bully” effect observed by [38].
Here, we observed that increasing within-group inequality increased group’s production. In
general, however, this is expected to depend on modeling details [36].
The models we have developed have more direct implications towards the theory of
leadership [63, 57, 121, 110, 37]. In particular, one of the roles leaders often take is the role
of punisher of defectors in collective actions [57, 88]. Experimental evidence has shown that
inter-group conflicts increases the punishment of defectors [102] and that when individuals
are heterogeneous in the cost of administering punishment, the punishment is carried out
by those with the lowest cost [26, 99]. Our models show that these behaviors naturally
emerge if there is within-group heterogeneity and foresight. Impromptu leaders are more
likely to emerge in groups that experience conflict with neighbors frequently. These results
are supported by earlier experimental findings [102].
There are several important directions the current model may be extended. First, we
assumed that the amount of “foresight” was fixed. Having established its usefulness in
promoting cooperation, it would be interesting to investigate if this ability could evolve
given certain costs and whether or not individuals with foresight would displace those without
foresight. Second, additional heterogeneity between individuals could be introduced into the
precision of individuals and the number of candidate strategies they can generate. A possible
route would be to associate the precision of an individual to their strength or payoffs. This
extension would mean that individuals who previously obtained greater amounts of a good
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have the luxury to more fully consider the consequences of their actions. Third, here we
assumed that all individuals updated their strategies using the same protocol. This could
be contrasted with the case where individuals use different strategy revision protocols. For
example, selective copying could result in groups where the extent to which individuals
enforce cooperation is more equal. Fourth, the weight of the level-2 expected payoffs, ω,
could be taken to be a dynamic trait. This means that as rounds progress individuals could
alter the emphasis they place on future payoffs. Fifth, we studied only one-step foresight
generalizing myopic optimization. However, individuals may be using higher-order theories
of mind and care about longer term payoffs [60, 61, 23, 24]. Models capturing these features
would be much more complex, but potentially more realistic. Finally, we assumed that
individuals attempt to maximize their material payoff and neglected any effects of past
history. In reality, individuals are often motivated by social norms and normative values [39]
and their current actions may be dependent on what happened to them or their groups in
the past [124]. All these are important factors that need to be considered in future work.
For instance, the foresight utility we explored here could be paired with a reputation score,
which has also been shown to solve the second-order free-rider effect.[94]
As societies continue to develop, the importance of cooperation steadily grows. However,
the intricacies of human motivations leave collective actions a deep and complex area of
research. In particular, balancing immediate versus delayed gratifications - undertaken by
all people daily - can be especially nuanced. By incorporating foresight into our model,
we have taken steps towards better understanding how our desires for the future shape the
society in which we live. The approach presented here is built upon concepts fundamental
to group living, and hence will serve as an integral part of completing our understanding of
collective action problems.
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Chapter 3
Foresight in a game of leadership
3.1

Introduction

The web of social and economic ties that weaves us together has never been thicker. Every
day we make decisions based on our expectations of how others will act [105]. While these
waters are difficult to traverse, we are not without aid as there exists a plethora of mores
to help us navigate this interpersonal maelstrom. The mores that coordinate political and
economic relationships are refered to as institutions [104, 84, 58]. Whether it is a teacher
corralling their students’ behavior or the United Nations placing sanctions on an entire
nation, institutions serve as an effective tool for resolving conflict and shaping behavior.
The role of institutions in modern society cannot be understated, with some claiming they
are the determining factor of whether nations succeed or fail [84, 1]. However, their origins
are much older than modern society as they existed even in hunter-gather groups [62].
In this paper, we are concerned with the institution of leadership. A leader is defined as
an individual who has non-random differential influence over group behavior [110]. Leaders
can take on several different roles within a group, e.g. role-models [131], managers [57],
punishers [12] or volunteers [3]. Leader-follower relationships are likely to emerge in groups
of conspecifics that benefit from acting in a unified manner [120]. Examples of actions that
necessitate high degrees of coordination include migration, hunting, deterring predation,
resolving internal conflicts, and competing with neighboring groups [120].

34

Joint actions often lead to the collective action problem [89] when all individuals can
benefit from an action but no one is willing to bear its cost. The collective action problem
(CAP) is present in many animal and human groups [10, 35, 52, 89, 127]. Several solutions
to the CAP exist. They include kin selection, direct and indirect reciprocity, punishment
[73], selective incentives and institutional design [89, 90], the presence of within-group
heterogeneity [2, 35, 38, 74] and influential individuals [40]. Here we are focused on the
solution by way of punishment and the institution of leadership.
In particular, we are concerned with the question of why leaders would choose to enforce
cooperation since abstaining from doing it could be less costly - the so called second-order
free-rider effect. In Chapter 2 we showed that in heterogeneous groups the second-order
free-rider effect could be overcome by incorporating foresight. Here we seek to investigate a
simplified model by developing a modified inspection game.
Inspection games are typically concerned with modeling an inspector that seeks to verify
the adherence to some pre-arranged contract and an inspectee that may be tempted to
violate said contract. In the past, inspection games have been used to better understand
relationships between law enforcement and criminals [117, 56], employers and their employees
[8], and countries dealing with nuclear armament [4]. Here we modify the standard inspection
game to account for interactions between a leader and a subordinate. We do this by altering
basic assumptions so that the subordinate has no incentive to produce a good, while the
leader has a vested interest in seeing the good produced. Our motivation for doing this is
to mirror a standard CAP with punishment in a two person game. In particular we are
interested in our model having properties that parallel the first- and second-order free-rider
effects. The simplicity of our proposed model allows us the opportunity to obtain analytical
results, which can in turn be used to provide a baseline understanding of more complicated
models.
To accurately portray the dynamics of the leader-subordinate relationship we must
consider the thought processes of both individuals. While both individuals are interested
in bettering their own positions, the leader has sway over the subordinate and must make
decisions based on this influence. This means that the leader must anticipate how their
subordinate will react and hence must take into consideration how their subordinate makes
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decisions. This consideration of other’s cognitive processes is referred to as a theory of
mind[98, 116]. A theory of mind is thought to be key to promoting cooperation withing
groups [116], has been linked to the size of individuals’ social networks [114], their propensity
for social cooperation [92], and the extent to which they are agreeable [82]. Standard
approaches of myopic optimization, adjustment through error and mutation, reinforced
learning, and selective imitation fail to account for this theory of mind. Here we continue
to develop the strategy update protocol of foresight [97], which, we argue, incorporates this
theory of mind and in doing so solves the second-order free-rider effect.
Foresight works by altering agents’ utility functions to consider not only how a strategy
will do in this round, but how it will affect the next round as well [97]. Fundamental to
foresight is the fact that agents consider how their actions will shape the future behaviors
of others. Thus it accounts both for human’s theory of mind and the “shadow of the
future” [5]. The major focus of our earlier work was the impact of foresight on a population
facing a collective action problem in the presence of peer punishment. We showed that in
heterogeneous groups possessing foresight a division of labor will develop where the strong
will specialize in enforcing the contributions of the weak. We now seek to further develop
our theory of foresight and obtain analytical results.
Our approach here is broken into several phases. We begin by developing a two-player
game based on the classical inspection game[33] to investigate the relationship between a
leader and their subordinate, which we dub the leadership game. (A similar model was
used to investigate the emergence and stability of behavioral norms [6].) As in our original
paper[97], we assume heterogeneity, but now take it to be systemic. This is done by predesignating a leader who serves as an enforcer over a subordinate. We show that the leader
lacks motivation to enforce the contribution of their subordinate despite their vested interests
in seeing goods produced. Our investigation of the leadership game is structured as follows.
First, we consider some typical approaches to analyzing the leadership game, e.g. Nash
equilibria, Quantal Response Equilibria (QRE) models, level-k models, and fictitious play
models. We follow this up by investigating the notion of foresight, which we previously
introduced [97]. Next, we incorporate error into our foresight model using machinery inspired
by QRE model. Our results show that the ability of foresight successfully motivates leaders
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Table 3.1: Payoff matrix for the basic leadership game.

Subordinate

Produce
Shirk

Leader
Inspects
(1 − θ)b − c, −h + θb
−d, −h − k

Don’t Inspect
(1 − θ)b − c, θb
0, 0

to punish subordinates, and in turn motivates subordinates to produce. Finally, we compare
and contrast foresight with two different learning protocols: selective imitation [55], and
Cross’s reinforced learning model [9]. We find that learning on its own is less effective at
promoting leadership than foresight.

3.2
3.2.1

Results
The leadership game

We consider a simple 2×2 game played between a leader and a subordinate, which is based on
the inspection game [33] described in Appendix B. The subordinate is tasked with producing
a good or benefit at a personal cost to themselves, while the leader has a vested interest in
seeing the good is produced. Since we are interested in drawing parallels with collective
action problems we make assumptions in such a way that the subordinate has no incentive
to see the good be produced.
The subordinate can either produce the good (P) or shirk on the production of the good
(S). In the case the subordinate produces the good, they pay a cost of c to produce a good
of value b. Any benefit produced by the subordinate is split with the leader in a θ : 1 − θ
ratio. Here θ can be thought of as a taxation rate. The strategies available to the leader
are to enforce production via inspection (I) are to not inspect (NI). Inspection costs the
leader h, but in the event that a leader inspects a non-producing subordinate they inflict a
punishment of d at a cost of k. Table 3.1 describes the corresponding payoffs while Table B.2
in the SM gives a summary of parameters.
Let x = 1 correspond to the subordinate producing the good, while x = 0 corresponds
to the subordinate shirking. Likewise, let y = 1 correspond to the leader inspecting, and
y = 0 correspond to the leader not inspecting. The payoff functions for the leader and the
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subordinate are thus given by
πS (x, y) = [(1 − θ)b − c]x − dy(1 − x).

(3.1a)

πL (x, y) = bθx − [h + k(1 − x)]y

(3.1b)

We will make three assumptions. First, we assume all parameters are positive. Second,
given the subordinate contributes (i.e., x = 1), the benefit to the leader exceeds the cost
of inspection, i.e., θb > h. Third, given our aforementioned interest in CAP, we assume
that without punishment (i.e., if y = 0) the subordinate is not motivated to contribute, i.e.,
(1 − θ)b < c. However, facing the threat of punishment (i.e., if y = 1), the subordinate is
motivated to contribute, i.e., c − (1 − θ)b < d.
From the above equations we can derive best response functions for the subordinate
BRS (y) given the leader’s action y and leader BRL (x) given the subordinate’s action x:
BRS (y) = y,

(3.2a)

BRL (x) = 0.

(3.2b)

That is, if the leader inspects (y = 1), the subordinate will produce (BRS = 1). If, however,
the leader doesn’t inspects, then the subordinate’s best option is to do nothing. This implies
that the subordinate can be motivated to produce the good. On the other hand, the leader’s
best response function is not to inspect no matter what the subordinate does.
Next we check if our game has any mixed Nash equilibria. Suppose that the subordinate
chooses to produce the good with probability p while the leader opts to inspect with
probability q. Then the expected payoffs are given by
ES (p, q) = pqπS (1, 1) + (1 − p)qπS (0, 1) + p(1 − q)πS (1, 0) + (1 − p)(1 − q)πS (0, 0) = p[(1 − θ)b − c] − (1
(3.3a)
EL (p, q) = pqπL (1, 1) + (1 − p)qπL (0, 1) + p(1 − q)πL (1, 0) + (1 − p)(1 − q)πL (0, 0)

= pθb − q[h + (1
(3.3b)
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From the above we can see that the subordinates best response depends upon the leaders
strategy, but the leader’s best response is independent of the subordinates action.

In

particular, there is a critical inspection rate of the leader (which can be found by setting
∂p ES (p, q) = 0) given by qcrit =

c−(1−θ)b
d

such that if q < qcrit , the subordinate is best off

doing nothing. If q > qcrit , the subordinate is best off producing the good. If q = qcrit , the
subordinate will receive the same payoff no matter what they do. The case of the leader
is much simpler, as the leader’s best response is always to do nothing: BRL (p) ≡ 0 as
partialq EL (p, q) = −[h + (1 − p)k].
Hence, the unique Nash equilibrium is at (p∗ , q ∗ ) = (0, 0) when the subordinate does not
contribute and the leader does not inspect, which means they both receive a payoff of zero.
In a corresponding evolutionary model with myopic optimization the system will converge
[77] to state (0, 0), that is, the system will naturally settle into the state of nothing being
done.

3.2.2

Quantal response equilibrium

Next, we generalize our results for the case when agents make errors in evaluating payoffs.
We do this by relaxing the assumption that individuals are best responders and replace
it with the assumption that individuals are better responders. In this new paradigm, all
strategies are played with non-zero probabilities, but the rate at which they are played is
proportional to their payoff. This approach leads us to investigate what is known as the
Quantal Response Equilibrium [46] of our model.
Let p be the probability the subordinate contributes, and q be the probability the leader
inspects. Let US,0 and US,1 be the expected payoff of not contributing and contributing to
the subordinate, respectively. Define UL,0 and UL,1 for the leader similarly. Following the
QRE approach, we now define
p=

1
1
,q =
,
1 + exp{λ(US,0 − US,1 )}
1 + exp{λ(UL,0 − UL,1 )}

(3.4a)

where λ is the precision parameter (e.g., with λ = 0, the players’ decision are random:
p = q = 0.5, while as λ → ∞, both player use myopic best response). Note that we assume
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both players have the same precision. The QRE solutions for p and q satisfy the equalities[46]
ln(p(1 − p))
ln(q(1 − q))
= US,0 − US,1 ,
= UL,0 − UL,1 .
λ
λ

(3.5a)

We solve the above equations numerically. Figure B.3 in the SM shows the impact that the
precision parameter λ has on the QRE values (p, q). For λ = 0 play is perfectly random so
that p = 21 , and q = 12 , as we would expect. As we increase λ, play converges to the single
pure Nash Equilibrium of (p∗ , q ∗ ) = (0, 0), again as we would expect. So unless error is very
high (i.e. λ is small), there will be not much inspection or contribution.
Before introducing foresight into our model, we show next that just incorporating a theory
of mind is not enough to overcome the free-rider-like effects. We consider two different models
attempting to capture the theory of mind.

3.2.3

Level-k approach

A common way for capturing a theory of mind in models of decision-making is by supposing
the agents utilize level-k rationality, which is a hierarchical way of thinking based on iterative
logic [113]. In it the most basic model of cognition is level-0 rationality, which makes agents
just play the strategies available to them at random. It is important to note, that players
are never assumed to be level-0, but rather it is the simplest model of others a player may
have. A level-1 player will assume that all other individuals are level-0 and select a strategy
which best responds to their predicted actions. Likewise, a level-2 player will assume all
others are level-1 and select a strategy accordingly. In this way we can iteratively define a
level-k player who will assume all others are level-k − 1 and choose a strategy which best
responds to their predicted action.
We begin by supposing both agents are level-1, which means they assume the other is
level-0. Generalizing slightly, we suppose that a level-0 subordinate is assumed to contribute
with probability p0 , while a level-0 leader is assumed to contribute with probability q0 (e.g.
p0 = q0 = 0.50). We do this to illustrate that assumptions on level-0 players matter and
can in fact impact the predictions of the model. Now the expected payoffs are given by
ES (p, q0 ) and EL (p0 , q) (See Equations (3.3a) and (3.3b)). This implies the best response
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for a subordinate is to not contribute provided the expected cost of being punished is less
than the net cost of producing, i.e. q0 d < c − (1 − θ)b. Likewise, it is best to contribute
provided the expected cost of being punished is greater than the net cost of producing. This
result immediately shows that the assumption made on level-0 players matters. Meanwhile
the leaders expected payoff is expected tax received minus the expected cost of inspection,
which is always maximized by setting q = 0 implying it is always best for the leader to not
inspect.
Now a level-2 subordinate will assume that the leader is level-1, and thus anticipates
that the leader will never inspect. This in turn means that a level-2 subordinate will never
contribute. A level-2 leader on the other hand will expect a subordinate to contribute
sometimes, but will always be better off doing nothing. So a level-2 leader will always opt to
not inspect. Finally, for levels 3 onward we have by similar logic that neither player will do
anything. Hence, level-k modeling is unable to overcome the free-rider-like problem in our
model.

3.2.4

Fictitious play

In the model of fictitious play [32], every player assumes their opponents are playing strategies
drawn from a certain stationary distribution which the player attempts to estimate via
observation. Each player then chooses their action in an attempt to maximize their payoff
given a prediction or assessment of their opponent’s strategy.
The leader assumes that the subordinate uses a mixed strategy contributing with a certain
probability. Let p̃(t) be the leader’s estimation of this probability at time t. The subordinate
assumes that the leader uses a mixed strategy inspecting with a certain probability. Let q̃(t)
be the subordinate’s estimation of this probability at time t. We take p̃(0), and q̃(0) to be the
initial beliefs. Let x(t) and y(t) be the action taken, i.e. 0 or 1, by the subordinate (S or P)
and leader (NI or I), respectively, in round t. Now we define a system of recurrence equations
describing how the leader and subordinate adjust their believes based on observations of
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previous actions
p̃(t + 1) =(1 − `)p̃(t) + `x(t),

(3.6a)

q̃(t + 1) =(1 − `)q̃(t) + `y(t).

(3.6b)

Here, ` is a parameter which scales the impact of the most recent action on the agent’s
estimation. In general, ` can depend on t. For example, ` =

1
1+t

corresponds to Fudenberg

and Levin’s (1998) original approach. The case of ` = 1 corresponds to myopic optimization.
Fictitious play itself is then defined as any rule the agent uses to choose a response from
the set of best responses to his or her estimation of the opponent’s strategy. For our case,
the choice of rule is simple. We choose the best response functions established above. Since
our game is dominance solvable via iteration (see the SM for details), we know that it will
converge to an equilibrium asymptotically [78]. As it has only one Nash equilibrium at
(x∗ , y ∗ ) = (0, 0), it will converge to it. This makes sense as a rational leader would never
choose to inspect as not inspecting offers a higher payoff in all circumstances, and a rational
subordinate would quickly learn this is the case and thus choose to not contribute. Hence,
fictitious play modeling is unable to overcome the free-rider-like problem in our model.

3.2.5

Foresight

Our results above show that under myopic optimization, level-k modeling, or fictitious play
leaders will fail to enforce and subordinates will fail to contribute. One method to overcoming
this is to introduce foresight [97]. If we assume that the leader is willing to suffer a cost this
round in order to make a gain in future rounds, then they could be motivated to inspect
the subordinate. More specifically, we introduce the parameter ω ∈ (0, 1), which measures
the weight placed on next round’s forecasted payoffs versus this round’s anticipated payoff.
This averaging of payoff now with payoff later can be compared with the typical practice
of discounting future payoffs. Where foresight is particularly novel is how we account for
the leader forecasting future payoffs. These forecasted payoffs depend upon the leader’s
model of their subordinate. This consideration of how their subordinate reasons is where our
leader’s theory of mind is on display. We assume that the leader’s model is based either on
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Table 3.2: Payoff matrix for the leadership game with foresight.

Subordinate

Produce
Shirk

Leader
Inspects
(1 − θ)b − c, (1 − ω)(θb − h) + ωθb
−d, −(1 − ω)(h + k) + ωθb

Don’t Inspect
(1 − θ)b − c, (1 − ω)θb
0, 0

a best response or QRE functions and focus on the effect foresight has on a leader’s strategy
selection.
Recall, that the leader’s standard payoff function is given by Equation (3.1b).

To

incorporate foresight we must allow the leader to consider not only what happens in this
round, but also what happens in the next round. Let x and y denote what the subordinate
and the leader do in this round of interactions, respectively. Moreover, let x̃ be what the
leader expects the subordinate to do in the next round in response to the leader’s action
in the this round. For now we will assume that the leader will expect the subordinate to
contribute in next round when the leader inspects in this round, and not contribute in the
next round if the leader does not inspect, i.e. x̃(y) = y. Now the leader will weigh the cost
of inspecting in this round (θbx − (h + k(1 − x))y) with the benefit expected in the next
round (θbx̃) yielding the leader’s utility function
ΠL = (1 − ω)(θbx − (h + k(1 − x))y) + ωθbx̃.

(3.7)

We refer to this equation as the leader’s 1-step level-2 foresight expected payoff or more
simply as the leader’s foresight payoff.

We assume that the subordinate is still using

the payoff function as given in Equation 3.1a and updating their strategy via myopic
optimization. This yields the payoff structure as outlined in Table 3.2.
Nash equilibrium
We can compute foresight’s effect on the game’s Nash equilibria (NE) with little effort by
using the indifference principle [70], i.e. we find the values of p∗ and q ∗ such that πS (0, q ∗ ) =
πS (1, q ∗ ) and ΠL (p∗ , 0) = ΠL (p∗ , 1) hold true. Let p∗ and q ∗ be the probabilities that the
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subordinate contributes and the leader inspects at NE. We find that our game now has up
to three NE depending upon parametric combinations.
In particular, when ωθb < (1 − ω)(h + k), i.e., the weighted benefit for next round is
less than the weighted cost inspecting and punishing in the current round, we have that
(p∗0 , q0∗ ) = (0, 0). When ωθb > (1 − ω)h, i.e., when the weighted benefit for the next round is
greater than the weighted cost of inspecting in the current round, we have there is a NE at
(p∗1 , q1∗ ) = (1, 1). If both the above inequalities hold, then we have a mixed NE at
(p∗2 , q2∗ )


=

(1 − ω)(h + k) − ωθb c − (1 − θ)b
,
(1 − ω)k
d


.

We note that only the subordinate’s strategy at equilibrium is dependent upon the foresight
parameter ω. This is because we only incorporated foresight into our leader’s utility function.
Figure 3.1 shows how the foresight parameter (ω) impacts the probability of the subordinate
contributing at Nash equilibria (p∗ ). We refer to a Nash equilibrium as stable if upon an
infinitesimal change in one player’s strategy then the (1) the player who did not change has
no better strategy to play in the new circumstances, and (2) the player who did change is
now playing a strictly worse strategy. This means that an unstable Nash equilibrium is one
where infinitesimally small perturbations in a player’s strategy cause the players to migrate
to a different Nash equilibrium. We see in Figure 3.1 that (p∗0 , q0∗ ) and (p∗1 , q1∗ ) are both
stable, but (p∗2 , q2∗ ) is unstable. What may appear confusing is the fact that p∗2 decreases in
ω, but this is to be expected as the frequency of contribution necessary to keep the leader
indifferent should decrease as the emphasis placed on the future payoffs increases. This is
because by caring more about future payoffs the leader begins to care too little about current
round payoffs and the subordinate capitalizes on that.
We may also compare the expected payoffs at the various Nash Equilibria.

The

expected payoff to the subordinate of playing strategy p against strategy q is still given
by Equation (3.3a), while the expected payoff to a leader capable of foresight of playing
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Figure 3.1: Impact of the foresight parameter ω on the probability p of contributing at
Nash equilibria of the leadership game with foresight. The solid lines represent the stable
Nash equilibria of our game, while the dashed lines show the unstable Nash equilibrium.
h+k
h
and ω2 = θb+h+k
.
Here ω1 = θb+h
strategy q against strategy p is
EL (p, q) = pqΠL (1, 1) + p(1 − q)ΠL (1, 0) + (1 − p)qΠL (0, 1) + (1 − p)(1 − q)ΠL (0, 0),
= (1 − ω)(pθb − (h + k(1 − p))q) + ωθbq.

(3.8)

Now ES (0, 0) = EL (0, 0) = 0, while ES (1, 1) = (1 − θ)b − c < 0 and EL (1, 1) = θb −
(1 − ω)h > 0. So the leader does the best at the (p∗ , q ∗ ) = (1, 1) Nash equilibrium, but the
subordinate does best at the (p∗ , q ∗ ) = (0, 0) equilibrium. We may also consider expected
payoffs at the mixed Nash equilibrium, which are ES (p∗2 , q2∗ ) = (1 − θ)b − c to the subordinate
and EL (p∗2 , q2∗ ) = [(1 − ω)(h + k) − ωθb]θb to the leader. So the subrodinate never does any
better at the mixed Nash equilibrium, while the leader can do better there provided that
ω <

h
+h+k−1
θb
h
+h+k+θb
θb

. Note that this is only feasible when the cost of punishing to the leader is

high, i.e. k > 1.
Iterated play
We now consider the case when our agents play the game repeatedly over many rounds.
Suppose we are at the first round of a multi-round interaction between the leader and
the subordinate. Each player has certain expectations of how the other will act. Namely,

45

1
*
2
*
1

0

q*0

0

1

q0
Figure 3.2: The parameter space (q0 , ω) in the case of foresight with no error. In the
blue region, it is optimal for the leader to inspect (q ∗ = 1), while in the white region,
it is optimal for the leader to do nothing (q ∗ = 0). On the boundary, denoted by the
dashed blue lines, the subordiante is indifferent to what strategy they choose as they all
h+k
h
, ω2∗ = θb+h+k
, and q0∗ = c−(1−θ)b
. Parameters:
yields the same payoff. Here ω1∗ = θb+h
d
b = 1, c = 2, d = 2, k = 1, h = 0.25, θ = 0.5, and ω = 0.5.
the leader will expect that the subordinate will contribute with probability p0 , while the
subordinate will expect the leader to inspect with probability q0 . These can be thought of as
our agents’ initial beliefs about one another. Now the expected payoff to the subordinate for
the mixed strategy p is given by ES (p, q0 ) where ES is as defined in Equation (3.3a), which
means the optimal probability p∗ to contribute with is dependent upon q0 . In particular, we
have that p∗ = 0 is q < qcrit and p∗ = 1 is q > qcrit , where qcrit is as before. (If q = qcrit , any
rate of contributing results in the same payoff.)
Next assume that our leader has the capability of foresight, that is the ability to not
only look towards the future but to account for how their actions now may shape the future
behavior of their subordinate. In our notation below, actions that are anticipated by the
leader will contain a tilde and the subscript will specify time. So for instance, x̃1 is what
the leader anticipates the subordinate will do in response to their own initial beliefs, i.e. q0 .
Likewise, x̃2 is what the leader anticipates the subordinate will do in response to the leader
action y1 (here y1 is the actual action of the leader in round 1).
We define the leader’s 1-step level-2 foresight expected payoff in round 1 by
ΠL (q0 , y1 ) = (1 − ω)[θbx̃1 − (h + k(1 − x̃1 ))y1 ] + ωθbx̃2 ,
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(3.9)

where x̃1 depends upon q0 and x̃2 depends upon y1 . Additionally, here θbx̃1 −(h+k(1− x̃1 ))y1
is the anticipated payoff in the impending round, θbx̃2 is part of the anticipated payoff in
the next round. The expected payoff of the mixed strategy p to the leader is thus redefined
as
EL = qΠL (q0 , 1) + (1 − q)ΠL (q0 , 0) = (1 − ω)(θbx̃1 − (h + k(1 − x̃1 ))q) + ωθbq.
We are assuming (for now) that the leader’s model of the subordinate is based on best
response, i.e. the leader is level-2.
Figure 3.2 summarizes when the leader is motivated to enforce cooperation (see the SM
for derivations). The region shaded blue corresponds to those parameter values for which
the leader’s optimal strategy is to always inspect, i.e. q ∗ = 1, while the white area are those
parametric combinations for which the leader’s optimal strategy is to do nothing, i.e. q ∗ = 0.
The boundaries - denoted by the dashed black line - are where q = qcrit . So long as we are
not on the boundary, we should remain in the same region in future rounds, e.g. if q1 = 1
then qt = 1 for t > 1. This means if the leader is sufficiently motivated to inspect in the
first round of interactions, they will be motivated to continue inspecting in all subsequent
rounds.
Incorporating error
We now seek to incorporate errors into the leader’s predictions of the actions of the
subordinate. We can interpret this error in one of two ways. First, it can be that the
leader makes mistakes when attempting to decide what the subordinate will do. Second, it
can be that the leader anticipates that the subordinate will make mistakes and takes this
into account. Either way, we define the probability the leader will predict the subordinate
contributes given the leader inspects with probability q as
p̃(q) =

1
,
1 + exp{λ(US,0 − US,1 )}

where US,0 and US,1 are as before. This means that the action the leader predicts their
subordinate will make (denoted x̃) is now a random variable equal to 1 and 0 with
probabilities p̃(q) and 1 − p̃(q), respectively.
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Figure 3.3: The effect of the benefit b, precision λ, and initial estimate of inspection
probability q0 on the optimal rate of inspection q ∗ . The critical points are represented
via the dashed lines, while the solid lines denotes the optimal rate of inspection q ∗ . The
parabola corresponds to the interior critical points of q± . Parameters: c = 2, d = 2, k =
1, h = 0.25, θ = 0.5, ω = 0.5.
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Figure 3.3 shows how the benefit b affects the optimal rate of inspection q ∗ (see the SM
for the derivations). In the graph, the strategies q = 0, q+ , q− , and 1 are plotted with dashed
lines while the solid black line denotes the optimal rate of inspection found numerically. For
the case of q0 = 0 (left column) we see that when the benefit is low the optimal rate of
inspection is 0, but once a certain threshold is crossed, inspecting - to a degree - becomes
optimal, in particular q ∗ = q+ . When q0 = 1 (right column), we have that the threshold
benefit is lower and the optimal rate of inspection is higher (even equal to 1 for large enough
b) than in the previous case. This suggests that motivating inspection is easier, in the
sense that a wider range of parameter values accomplishes it, when the leader is assumed
to inspect. This of course makes sense, as it would be easier to motivate inspection if it is
assumed by the subordinate that the leader is already going to inspect. This is because if the
subordinate expects the leader will inspect, then they will contribute and by contributing
they effectively reduce the cost of inspecting by ensuring the leader won’t have to pay to
punish. We see for higher precision (λ = 5) that the threshold benefit is reduced and the
rate of optimal inspection decreases in b rather than increases with it.
Now we can approximate numerically the minimum value of benefit b for which a positive
rate of inspection is optimal, which we henceforth refer to as the critical benefit denoted by
b∗ . Doing so yields Figure 3.4, which shows the impact of foresight ω and precision λ on b∗ .
The first thing to note is that for the case of λ = 0 we have b∗ =

c
1−θ

which violates our

assumption that (1 − θ)b < c, which means that in the case of no precision the leader cannot
be motivated to inspect. In all other cases we see that the critical benefit decreases as ω
increases. This is what we would expect to see, as an increased emphasis on foresight should
mean the threshold to motivate the leader to inspect is lowered. As the precision increases,
the critical value b∗ decreases, which is again what we would expect to see.
Finally, Figure 3.5 shows an analogue to Figure 3.2 in the case of foresight with different
values of precision λ. We see for low error (λ = 1 in leftmost plot) that the willingness to
inspect (shaded blue) is more or less purely dependent upon the emphasis placed on future
payoffs ω. As we increase precision, the expectations of subordinate q0 begins to play a larger
role in determining willingness to inspect, until it resembles the case of best response when
λ = 100 (rightmost plot). Similar to the case of best responses, we see that leaders prefer a
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Figure 3.5: Analogous to Figure 3.2 when error is present in foresight. The region shaded
blue denotes the values of parameters for which it is optimal for the leader to inspect.
Parameters: b = 1, c = 2, d = 2, k = 1, h − .25, θ = 0.5, and ω = 0.5.
largely all or nothing approach, i.e. they either abstain from inspecting entirely or inspect
with very high probability.

3.2.6

Comparison of foresight with learning

Finally we compare foresight with two models of learning: reinforcement learning [9] and
selective imitation [55].
Reinforcement learning
In reinforcement learning, agents form opinions of strategies based on the payoffs received
when those strategies are implemented. Following [9], we define the utility UX (x, y) to player
X ∈ L, C when the leader plays y ∈ 0, 1 and the subordinate plays x ∈ 0, 1 as
exp{πX (x, y)}
,
0 0
x0 ,y 0 exp(πX (x , y ))

UX (x, y) = P
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(3.10)

where πX (x, y) is the payoff to X as given by Equations (3.1a) and (3.1b). The sum in the
denominator is over the four possible combinations of x0 and y 0 values. By this construction,
utility increases with the payoff, and all utilities fall between 0 and 1. We use the integer t
to keep track of the current round of play. At the beginning of each round, both players are
characterized by the probability with which they employ their strategies. Keeping with our
notation, we let the probability the subordinate contributes at time t be denoted by p(t),
and likewise let the probability the leader inspects at time t be denoted by q(t).
All that is left is to specify the rule by which players update their states (p(t) and q(t)).
Suppose that in round t the leader plays x, while the subordinate plays y, then we define

U (x, y) + (1 − U (x, y))p(t) if x = 1
S
S
p(t + 1) =
,

(1 − US (x, y))p(t)
if x = 0

(3.11)

and q(t + 1) is defined similarly. What this means is that, after players observe how their
current action did, they update their state by taking a weighted average between their old
state, p(t) and the state that puts all the weight on the current action (either 0 or 1), where
utility US (x, y) serves as the weight. For a given initial random condition (p(0), q(0)) the
above equations defines a stochastic process, which is referred to as Cross’ learning process
[9].
We studied this process numerically. Typically, the population quickly settles into an
equilibrium, with subordinate/leader pairs choosing either to always contribute/inspect, or
never contribute/inspect (see Figure B.4 in the Appendix B for an example). To see how
frequently one happens over the other we look to Figure 3.6, which illustrates the effect
that the benefit and tax rate parameters have on the equilibrium values. We see for the
subordinate that efforts increase in the benefit b and decrease in the tax rate θ. Moreover,
the impact of taxation is more severe for higher levels of benefit. For the leader, q ∗ increases
in the benefit b, while increases in the tax rate θ are perplexingly met with decreases in q ∗ .
This is likely a result of the taxation rate’s effect on the subordinate, namely by decreasing
how likely a subordinate is to contribute it also raises the cost of inspecting to the leader
which makes the leader less willing to inspect. The black dots in Figure 3.6(a and b) show
the values of inspection and contribution predicted by the foresight model. We see that
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Figure 3.6: The effects of the benefit b and the tax rate θ on the equilibrium frequencies
of contribution p∗ (a) and inspection q ∗ (b) in Cross’ reinforced learning process (bars with
error bars) compared to the values predicted by the model with foresight (black dots), and
the impact on the expected joint payoffs (c) with the expected joint payoff predicted by the
foresight model in blue and the one predicted by Cross’ reinforced learning process in red.
In each graph, the clusters correspond to b = 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5; within each cluster the values
(from left to right) correspond to tax rate θ = 0.25, 0.50, 0.75. The error bars denote the
95% confidence intervals for the Cross’ reinforced learning process which is stochastic, note
there are no error bars for the foresight model as it is deterministic. Simulations were run
for 1,000 time steps; 500 independent runs. Other parameters: c = 2, d = 2, h = 0.1, k = 1,
and λ = 4.
for low benefit (b = 1.0) the foresight model predicts less inspection than the Cross model,
while for medium benefit (b = 1.5) the foresight model predicts more inspection than the
Cross model provided the tax rate is low (θ = 0.25). For high benefit (b ≥ 2.0) the foresight
model predicts more inspection than the Cross model for all tax rates. Interesting is the
comparison of the joint expected payoffs depicted in Figure 3.6(c), which shows in all cases the
joint expected payoff predicted by the foresight model (blue dots) exceeds the joint expected
payoff predicted by Cross’ reinforced learning process (red dots). This suggests that the
collective (the leader and subordinate) do better as a whole when foresight is implemented.
Selective imitation
Assume next that individuals compare their payoff with that of a groupmate and choose
to either copy the selected individual (if their payoff is higher than the focal individual’s)
or keep their own strategy [55]. Let individuals be randomly paired up with each pair
containing a subordinate and a leader. Let the i-th pair’s actions at time t be denoted by
si (t) = (pi (t), qi (t)) where all variable retain their usual interpretations. For each individual
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i, randomly select a peer j (i.e. leader for leader and subordinate for subordinate) and have
the focal individual observe that peer’s payoff and action. Then the probability that at time
t individual i continues playing their current action given they observed individual j is
pt (i → i|j) =

exp{λπS (xi (t), yi (t))}
,
exp{λπS (xi (t), yi (t))} + exp{λπS (xj (t), yj (t))}

which of course means the probability i switches to mimic j is pt (i → j|j) = 1 − pt (i → i|j).
Numerical simulations show that when both leaders and subordinates update via selective
imitation, the leaders and subordinates opt to do nothing. Hence, when utilized by both
agents, selective imitation is thus not a feasible route to overcoming the leader’s inertia.
Next assume that subordinates update via myopic optimization. Figure 3.7 compares
the levels of inspection predicted when leaders use foresight model (black dots) or selective
imitation (bars). If initially only 5% of the leaders inspect (top row), foresight results in
higher levels of inspection than selective imitation. If initially 50% of leaders inspect (bottom
row), foresight results in lower inspection than selective imitation. This suggests that both
methods can be effective in motivating the leaders to inspect provided conditions are right.
However, a comparison of the joint expected payoff shows that foresight (blue dots) yield
either the same or higher joint expected payoffs than the selective imitation (red dots). Thus,
once again, the collective is better off as a whole when foresight is used.

3.3

Discussion

Here we have studied the impact of foresight on leader-subordinate dynamics in some simple
models. Our aim in doing this was to shed light on what can motivate individuals to enforce
contribution to production of a collective good. Typically, such enforcement comes with
an inherent cost that discourages group members from being coercive as they seek to avoid
the cost. This is known as the the second-order free-rider problem. Earlier work highlighted
several mechanisms such as meta-punishment [12], conformism [51], signaling [44], and groupselection [11, 111] as potential routes to overcoming the second-order free-rider problem. We
have shown here as well as in [97] that, in addition to these mechanisms, foresight is an
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Figure 3.7: Comparison of foresight predictions (black dots) with the equilibrium values
of p and q obtained in the selective imitation model when the subordinate updates via
myopic optimization (bars with error bars). The left column (a and d) are the contribution
frequency at equilibrium (p∗ ) while the middle column (b and e) are the inspection frequency
at equilibrium (q ∗ ), and the right column (c and f) are the expected joint payoffs. The top
row (a-c) are the case when 5% of the population started as inspectors, and the bottom row
(d-f) is the case when 50% of the population started as inspectors. In each graph the clusters
(from left to right) correspond to a benefit level of b = 1, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, while the individual
bars (from left to right) correspond to tax rates of θ = 0.25, 0.50, 0.75. The error bars denote
the 95% confidence intervals. Simulations were run for 1,000 time steps. Other parameters:
c = 2, d = 2, k = 1, h = 0.1.
effective way of motivating leaders to lead. “Foresight” refers to a novel strategy update
protocol, which stresses two key components [97]. First, that individuals care about their
future payoffs. Second, that individuals consider how others will respond to their present
actions in future interactions. Both of these are fairly intuitive assumptions that make few
requirements of agent’s cognitive abilities. By developing foresight we sought to incorporate
the deterrence theory into our model, which is the notion that punishment is used to modify
the future behavior of the target.
We approached this problem by altering the payoffs and assumptions of the inspector
game[33]. In particular, we were concerned with modeling the interaction between a single
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leader interested in enforcing production and a single commoner tasked with producing some
good. In this way we were able to incorporate characteristics of the general collective action
problem (namely the first- and second-order free-rider effects) into a simple 2x2 game. While
our earlier work [97] has relied exclusively on numerical simulations, the simplicity of our
models here has allowed us to get some analytical results.
We started by considering several different ways of simulating human behaviour, namely
Nash equilibria, quantal response equilibria, level-k cognition and fictitious play. Our results
show that each of these methods were vulnerable to the second-order free-rider problem.
That is, in these basic models while the subordinate could be motivated to produced the
good, the leader was not inclined to enforce production and as a result nothing got done. We
proceeded by analyzing the effect foresight had on the best response functions and the Nash
equilibrium. Upon introducing foresight, we saw that the leader now viewed punishment
as an utility increasing action and thus (provided sufficient emphasis on future payoffs)
willingly enforced production of their subordinate. Foresight in the subordinate only served
to lessen the magnitude of the their payoff. This difference in impact is due the fact that the
subordinate’s action do not directly influence the leader on the same scale as the leader’s
action directly influence the subordinate. Our main results are that the introduction of
foresight produced new Nash equilibria at which leaders led and subordinates followed. These
new equilibria were found to be dependent upon the emphasis placed on future payoffs ω.
Additionally, we found that in the repeated leadership game that foresight could effectively
overcome the second-order free-rider effect. Even when error was introduced into the leader’s
predictions, they were motivated to inspect provided certain conditions were met. Our final
task was to compare foresight with two other strategy update protocols: reinforcement
learning and selective imitation. Our numerical results indicated that while reinforcement
learning could overcome the second-order free-rider effect, it was not as effect as overcoming
it was when foresight was present. The same held true for selective imitation.
Our work highlights the importance of strategy revision protocols in evolutionary
dynamics [103]. While the free-rider problems exists regardless of the strategy revision
protocol employed, the assumptions made on how people think can impact how effective
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groups are at overcoming these problems. Our protocol of foresight is a new way to consider
how people think, which can be used in conjuncture with existing strategy revision protocols.
Our approach is related to models of level-k cognition [79, 113]. In the course of our
investigation of the basic level-k leadership game, we showed that the exact assumptions
placed on the level-0 players impacts the overall dynamics of the game. While typically
assumed to choose their strategies uniformly randomly, we investigated the impact that
level-0 players adhering to static or non-uniform randomness had on the dynamics of the
model. We saw that this change in assumptions altered the strategies chosen by higher level
players. The foresight protocol employed by our leaders corresponds to level-2 reasoning as
they anticipate how others will react to their actions. It is the authors’ assertion that this
assumption on leaders is both reasonable and natural to make.
There are several different questions of interest that must be answered by future work.
First and foremost is the question of whether foresight would evolve in a population where
it is initially absent. In our current and prior chapters, we have taken for granted that
foresight is present and sought only to show how it could be an effective route to overcoming
the second-order free-rider problem. Having proved its efficacy we should now turn our
attention to whether or not its emergence is a reasonable assumption. Secondly, here we
considered the leadership game for only two players. A reasonable extension would be to
assume multiple agents acting in the role of subordinates (and potential in the role of leaders
as well). Thirdly, our results indicate that foresight can affect the basic dynamics of a game
(in that it alters the Nash equilibria). It would be a worthwhile endeavour to investigate the
impact foresight has on a wider range of classical games.
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Chapter 4
Evolution of precision
4.1

Introduction

Humans as a species have been able to accomplish a lot compared to other animals. We can
attribute this to our intelligence, which greatly exceeds that of other species. This, however,
does not mean that humans are always able to choose the best choice. In fact, experimental
evidence has shown that humans often deviate from the mathematically predicted best
response. [46] This raises the question of why do humans deviate from the responses predicted
by classical game theory. One possible explanation is that the deviations seen are due to
mistakes or misunderstanding on the part of the players. As Alexander Pope so succinctly
put, "to err is human." Why then when attempting to model interactions between human
agents would a modeler assume perfect rational, best responders? This suggests that a new
way of modeling human agents is necessary to further our understanding of how people
interact. In particular, this new paradigm must incorporate bounded rationality.
The notion of bounded rationality is a simple one, the rationality of individuals is limited
by the information they posses, their cognitive limitations, and the time available to make a
decision. It is the second limitation that inspired the notion of quantal response equilibrium
(QRE) in the field of economics. [46] In the view of QRE models, the assumption that players
are best responders is relaxed and replaced with the assumption that players are better
responders. That is they choose strategies proportional to their payoffs with all strategies
being chosen with some nonzero probability. The sensitivity a player has towards payoff
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differences is measured by a parameter λ, which ranges from 0 to ∞. In the case of λ = 0,
individuals cannot tell the difference between payoffs no matter how severe. In contrast is
the case when λ = ∞ which is akin to myopic optimization, i.e. the agents always choose the
strategy that maximizes their payoffs no matter how minute the differences in payoffs may
be. It has been shown that QRE models are more accurate when predicting the behavior of
lab participants.
While the theory that humans make errors in judgment that lead to them drifting away
the type of behavior predict by rational play is sound, there exists no investigation into
why this might be the case. In particular, the question must be asked why did humans
evolve bounded rationality and not perfect rationality? We are clearly capable of perfect
rationality in some situations - else we wouldn’t know what perfectly rational play would
predict in games such as the prisoner’s dilemma or the hawk-dove game - and yet when it
comes to strategic interactions we are prone to making errors even in simple games. It is
this vein of questioning that this chapter seeks to investigate. I will begin the investigation
by describing a general framework that will be used to investigate the evolution of precision
in the prisoner’s dilemma and the linear public goods game as well as some of its extensions.
My results suggest that the costs (e.g. metabolic intake) required to sustain higher levels
of precision limit the evolution of precision in agents to relatively low levels. This limited
precision affects the likelihood agents are to cooperate.

4.2

General framework

Consider a game being played between agents and focus on single player. Suppose for our
focal player there are two strategies - call them a and b - with the payoffs of πa and πb ,
respectively. The focal player will play strategy a with probability
p(λ) =

1
.
1 + exp{λ(πb − πa )}

I define the focal player’s fitness to be
f = πa p(λ) + πb (1 − p(λ)) − κ(λ),
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which is simply the focal individual’s expected payoff given a precision level of λ minus κ(λ)
the genetic cost associated with having a precision level of λ. Here κ(λ) can be interpreted as
the caloric resources needed to maintain a brain capable of more minute differentiation. The
exact form that κ takes is unkown to us, but for simplicity of calculations we will assume it
is linear, i.e. κ(λ) = kλ where k is some scaling factor. Now we define r =

r0
s

=

πa√
−πb
,
k

which

is just the difference in payoffs divided by the scaled cost of precision. So we can reduce the
above equation to

f = rs

1
1 + exp{−rsλ}



+ πb − s2 λ.

Our goal is to see for what value of λ the fitness function f attains its maximum value as this
is where evolution will naturally move the level of precision. This is done by differentiating
f with respect to λ to obtain
∂λ f = −s2 +

r2 s2 exp{−rsλ}
.
(1 + exp{−rsλ})2

Next we set ∂λ f = 0 to obtain the critical points
−1
λ± (r, s) =
ln
rs

(

r2 − 2 ±

)
p
r2 (r2 − 4)
.
2

(4.1)

So we know that precision will evolve to either λ+ (r, s) or λ− (r, s). We can see for −2 < r < 2
(i.e. small differences in the payoffs) that λ± are both imaginary. In Figure 4.1 we see the
impact the parameters r0 and s have on the critical points. Let us begin by examining the
behavior of the critical points for r0 ≤ −2s. We see that for low r0 values as we increase
∗
r0 the critical point λ+ increases until a critical point is reached (call it r0−
) and then the

critical point decreases in r0 until it reaches 0. The critical point obtains the value 0 at
r0 = −2s. For the region −2s < r0 < 2s, we see that the critical points are imaginary.
Similar to at the point r0 = −2s, the critical points obtain values of 0 at the point r0 = 2s.
Once we increase r0 beyond 2s, we see the value of λ− increases in r0 until a critical point is
∗
reached (call it r0+
) and then the λ− decreases in r0 . We also investigate the impact of the

cost of precision s. As seen earlier, increasing s increases the size of the region for which λ±
are imaginary. We also see the optimal level of precision is higher for lower s, which makes
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Figure 4.1: Impact of the parameter r0 and s on the critical points λ± (in blue and red
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to s = 2.0.
sense as when it is cheaper to evolve more precision we would expect precision to evolve to
higher levels. We can see this more clearly in Figure 4.2. which directly shows the impact
of s on λ± . We see that the optimal precision grows asymptotically towards infinity as we
let s → 0− . We also see that as we increase s that the optimal level of precision decreases
until it reaches zero after which point it is imaginary.
So what does this mean in practical terms? Well these results could explain why different
species would evolve differing levels of precision. In particular, if one species were to have
different restraints on its cognitive development or if the types of CAP participated in
different in their benefit-to-cost ratio than we would expect to see the species evolve different
levels of precision. For instance, early humans could have participated in CAP where the
benefit-to-cost ratio was such that high levels of precision were optimal, while other species
may have dealt with benefit-to-cost ratios that were closer to even. To put this into context
we next consider the evolution of precision with a particular game in mind.

4.3

Evolving precision in the prisoner’s dilemma

Let us now consider the example provided by a specific game. We will begin with a simple
2 × 2 game, the prisoner’s dilemma. Suppose we have two players X and Y each with
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respectively). Here we set r0 = 1.
the option of cooperating (C) or defecting (D). The payoffs are given by Table 4.1, where
T > R > P > S and p (and q) are the probability of X (and Y ) cooperating.
Table 4.1: Payoff matrix for the prisoner’s dilemma.
Cooperate (p)
Cooperate (q)
R, R
Defect (1 − q)
T, S

Defect(q)
S, T
P, P

So the expected payoff to X of playing C is given by
πC = Rq + S(1 − q),
while the expected payoff of playing D is given by
πD = T q + P (1 − q).
So we define r =

(R−T )q+(S−P )(1−q)
s

where s =

√

k.

We see results for this game in Figure 4.3, which shows the effect that the parameter
q has on the optimal level of precision (left) and the probability of the focal individual
cooperates (right). Let us begin by investigating the case when the parameter combination
is given by T = 6, R = 2, P = 1, S = 0, k = 1. For low q, we see (top-left) the optimal level of
precision is 0, but as we increase the probability the opponent cooperates the optimal level of
61

precision increases. We see (top-right graph) that as we increase the probability the opponent
cooperates the probability the focal player cooperates decreases. We attribute this to the fact
that the temptation to defect T is so much larger than the benefit afforded to cooperating. To
investigate this further, we reset R = 5, P = 4 (bottom row) and see that precision now starts
high for low q, but decreases as we increase q. Likewise the probability the focal individual
contributes starts low, but increases as we increase the probability the opponent cooperates.
This is looked at in more detail in Figure 4.4, which shows the impacts of different values
of R and P for varying values of q. We see for q = 0.00 that P has the larger impact on
the precision, while in the case of q = 1.00 R has the larger impact. This makes sense as
when the focal individual expects their opponent will never cooperate the penalty they face
for both defecting is more influential than the reward for cooperating, while the opposite
is true when the focal individual expects their opponent to always cooperate. Thus the
impact of their opponent to cooperate is heavily dependent upon parametric combinations.
However, no matter the scenario we see that probability of contribution by the focal player
never exceeds 0.50.

4.4

Evolving precision in the linear public goods game

Let us now investigate the example provided by the liner public goods game (LPGG)
Consider a group of N and suppose they have a genetically determined precision level,
which is evolving over time. We assume that m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} individuals are known to
be contributing towards the public good, and investigate the evolutionary pressures exerted
on a focal individual. Suppose our focal individual’s precision is represented by λ and the
probability they contribute towards the public good is given by p, where
p(λ) =

1
.
1 + exp{λ(π0 − π1 )}
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Figure 4.3: Results for the prisoner’s dilemma. Left: Impact of the probability the
opponent cooperates (q) on the critical points λ± (in red and blue respectively) and the
optimal level of precision λ∗ (black dashed line). Right: The probability of the focal player
choosing to cooperate as a function of q. Parameters for the top: T = 6, R = 2, P = 1, S = 0,
and k = 1; parameters for the bottom:T = 6, R = 5, P = 4, S = 0, and k = 1.
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Here π0 and π1 are the payoffs to the focal individual supposing they don’t and do contribute,
respectively. These are given more precisely by

b
m,
N
b
π1 = (m + 1) − c.
N
π0 =

(4.2a)
(4.2b)

For notational simplicity we will let
π01 = π0 − π1 = c − r
, and π10 = −π01 . Here we let r =

π10
s

where s =

√

(4.3)

k. This means by Equation (4.1) that

s


 b2
b2
b2
2 −2 bc
2 −2 bc
2 −2 bc


+c
+c
+c


N
N
N
N2
N2
N2


−
2
±
−
4


k
k
k



√
− k
ln
λ± =
b/N − c 





2

.







Our first observation is that the parameter m has no impact on the optimal level of precision
predicted by the model. This suggests that - unlike the case of the prisoner’s dilemma - the
groupmates have no influence on what level of precision a focal player will evolve to have.
This is beneficial to our analysis as it means we are justified in considering a single focal
player as all other individuals will be behaving in the same manner.
Now Figure 4.5 shows the analytical results obtained as well as numerical approximations.
The blue lines are λ− while the red are λ+ , and the dashed black line is the numerical
approximation of the optimal precision λ∗ . We see that the optimal precision aligns with
λ− for r > 2 and with λ+ for r < −2, and with λ = 0 for −2 < r < 2. How can we
interpret these results? When benefit is low the cost of mistakenly contributing is high, and
thus it pays to spend some fitness on increasing ones precision to avoid this outcome. As
the benefit is increased the cost of accidentally contributing is lessened and thus it makes
sense that optimal precision should decrease. This occurs until precision hits 0, which occurs
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Figure 4.5: Left: Impact of the parameter r on the critical points λ± (in red and blue
respectively) and the optimal level of precision λ∗ (black dashed line). Right: The probability
of the focal player choosing to contribute as a function of r.
in an interval around r = c. It occurs in said interval, because when r = c the benefit to
contributing is the same the benefit of not contributing and so it makes sense that p = 1/2
which implies λ = 0. Near r = c it also makes sense that the optimal λ would be 0 as
the evolution of λ would be limited by the evolutionary cost of increasing precision. Once,
however, benefit increases enough we see increases in the optimal λ. This is because a larger
λ is necessary to capitalize on the increased benefit (want p > 1/2 to increase f ). There is,
however, a tipping point after which increase in benefit see decreases in optimal precision.
This is because the benefit becomes so great that even individuals with low precision will
be able to differentiate between contributing and not contributing. We note, that typical
investigations into the linear public goods game neglect the case of b > cN , but we include
it here for the sake of completeness. We also note that the level of cooperation predicted by
our model exceed myopic optimization in the case of b < cN , but fall short for the case of
b > cN .
We can also investigate the the impact of the genetic cost of precision k. We have these
results summarized by Figure 4.6 below. As expected the optimal level of precision decreases
as the cost of precision increases until the optimal level of precision is 0.

4.5

Agent based model of evolving precision

In this section we aim to develop an agent based model to investigate the evolution of
precision. I assume asexual reproduction, and non-overlapping generations. Additionally,
we consider individuals living in G groups of size N participating in a collective action
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problem. The order of events goes as follows: first individuals decided on whether they wish
to contribute towards the collective action, second their payoffs/fitnesses are computed, and
thirdly they reproduce, fourthly they perish, and finally the offspring segregate randomly
into new groups. The individual i posses a precision of λi (t) at time t, which is assumed to
be under selective pressures. The initial precisions are set to be low, in particular they are
drawn from max{0, N (0, .001)}. The probability i contributes towards the public good is
given by
pi (t) =

1
,
1 + exp{λi (t)(c − b/N )}

which means the action of i is a the random variable

xi (t) =

We let X(t) =

P

i


1

with probability pi (t)

.

0 with probability 1 − p (t)
i

xi (t). The individuals’ fitnesses are then given by


X(t)
fi (t) = min 0, b
− cxi (t) − kλi (t) ,
N

where b is the benefit produced by a single contributor, and c is the cost of contributing to a
single individual. Once fitnesses have been established, reproduction takes place. Individuals
reproduce proportional to their fitnesses (Roulette wheel selection) with the offspring of
individual i inheriting a precision of max{0, N (λi , σ)} (i.e. the parent’s strategy subject to
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precision predicted by the base model. Parameters: b = 48, c = 1, N = 16, G = 100, and
k = 0.1.
white noise with a minimum of 0 being possible) where σ can be thought of as the mutation
rate. Once reproduction takes place individuals divide randomly into groups of size N .
Figure 4.7 displays a time-series of the agent based model. We plot the results of 10
independent simulations (gray lines are the mean over all group’s means) and the mean over
the independent runs (red line). We see that as time progresses that the precision increases
as a result of selection pressures. Notable is that the mean looks to be evolving towards the
level of precision predicted by the base model (represented by the dashed black line). We
have five parameters of interests, namely: the benefit b, the cost c, the group size N , the
mutation rate σ, and the genetic cost of precision k.
Let us begin by investigating the impact of the benefit b and the group size N . We would
expect (based on the analytical results we obtained earlier) to see a negligible effect of N ,
and a nonlinear effect of b. Looking at Figure 4.8 this is exactly what we see. In the figure
the clusters (from left to right) correspond B = 1, 2, 4 while the individual bars (from left to
right) in each cluster correspond to N = 2, 4, 8, 16, 32. We see slight increases in the optimal
precision as we move left to right in each cluster, but the overall differences are negligible.
Meanwhile increase the benefit B sees a marked increase (at B = 4.0) followed by a decrease,
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Figure 4.8: Effects of the benefit b and the group size N on the equilibrium values (left)
and their associated probability of cooperating (right) predicted by the agent-based model.
The clusters (from left to right) correspond to B = 1, 2, 4, 8 while within each cluster the
bars (from left to right) correspond to N = 2, 4, 8, 16, 32. The black lines represent the
predictions made by the analytical results. Other parameters are c = 1, k = .5 and σ = 0.01.
which is similar to the results predicted in the earlier section. Interestingly, the impact of
N is even more muted on the probability of contributing. Figure 4.9 shows the impact of
the cost parameter c. We see it has a nonlinear effect which depends upon the value of
B. We note that while the values predicted by the agent-based model and the analytical
model differ they behave similarly. Looking to the probability of contributing towards the
public good we see that it decreases as c increases. Finally, we examine the impact of the
mutation rate σ and the cost of precision k. We see the smaller the mutation rate the closer
the agent-based model’s equilibrium values are to the analytical predictions, which can be
thought of as a result of fine-tuning. Additionally, the smaller the mutation rate the longer
the model takes to reach equilibrium (data not shown). We also have that k factors into
how severe the agent-based model’s predictions differ from the analytical model. Specifically,
the larger the k the more the agent-based model’s equilibrium values exceed the analytical
predictions.

4.5.1

Precision dependent payoffs

Next we consider a generalization of the above agent-based model where the share of the
public good received by an individual is dependent upon their precision. In particular, we
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assume that an individual i receives a share of the public good proportional to their precision,
which gives us
λi (t)
bX(t) − cxi (t) − κλi (t).
j=1,N λj (t)

fi (t) = P

The idea behind this extension is that precision could be used as a measuring rod for
intelligence, and that a more intelligent individual would be capable of accruing a larger
or better share of the public good or perhaps just make better use of it. Interestingly, this
extension creates a selective pressure within the group to have a precision level higher than
one’s contemporaries. We see the results of this extension in Figure 4.11, which is analogous
to Figure 4.8. Immediately noticeable is the how much larger the equilibrium values in the
extension are compared to the original agent-based model. Additionally, the effect of B is
more linear while the impact of the the group size is no longer negligible. We also have that
the agents are now fully capitalizing on the case of B = 2 whereas before they were not.

4.6

Discussion

In this chapter we have explored the impact of evolution of precision in agents participating
in CAPs. We saw that the two crucial factors in determining the level of precision an agent
71

would evolve to have were the different in payoffs from contributing and not contributing,
and the cost of precision. This suggests that the exact type of CAP agents participate in is
heavily influential in determining what level of precision the evolve to have.
To further explore the impact of evolution we considered two specific types of CAP
problems.

First we investigate agents participating in the classical prisoner’s dilemma

and second we consider agents participating in the linear public goods game. From our
investigation of the prisoner’s dilemma we had two main results. First, we saw depending
on parametric combinations increasing the likelihood that their opponent cooperates the
optimal precision (and level of cooperation) would increase or decrease. Hence, what you
opponent did was highly influential in determining what level of precision the focal player
would evolve to have. Second, the probability of participation seen in the focal player never
exceeded 50%. From here we generalized to the case of an n-person linear public goods
game. Again we had two major takeaways. First - and possibly most interestingly - we saw
here that the impact of what the other agents were doing was zero. This means the level of
precision an agent would evolve to have is independent of how likely their groupmates are
to contribute. This leads to the second takeaway that the type of CAP being participated
in influences what factors are key to predicting the optimal level of precision. In the case of
the linear public goods game the only factors in determining the optimal level of precision
are the genetic costs associated with higher precision, and the benefit-to-cost ratio.
To test the robustness of these predictions, we developed an agent-based model of
evolving precisions. While the equilibrium values obtained by the agent-based model differed
quantitatively from those predicted by the analytical model the two were qualitatively
similarly. Additionally, we found that the rate of mutation in inherited traits had an impact
on how severe the two models’ predictions differed. For smaller mutation rates (the more
biologically feasible option) the differences were negligible but the time to reach equilibrium
was extended. The fact that the equilibrium values exceed the predicted values when
mutation is high and the cost of precision is low suggests that the impact of internal factors
- such as susceptibility to mutation - cannot be ignored when investigating the evolution of
bounded rationality.
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The development of an agent-based model to investigate the question of evolving precision
is an important step as it allows for several future directions. In particular, using an agentbased approach, investigations into model extensions that are not analytically tractable
can be made. One such extension is the case when spoils are divided based upon relative
precision, which in this case is used as a measuring rod for intelligence. It makes logical sense
that a more intelligent individual would be able to use their intelligence to obtain a larger
share of the reward or make better use of the same reward. The results for this extension
showed that under these conditions agents evolved to have much higher levels of precision,
but the biological cost associated with higher precision kept the agents precision levels from
running away towards infinity. Future extensions could focus on evaluating more complex
and realistic forms of the genetic costs of precision. Additionally, the inclusion of the option
to punish one’s groupmates would be an interesting extension.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and future directions
Given how complex our world is, it is no wonder that we seek to illuminate our way by
making models. These silhouettes of reality give us peeks into existence that are both
comprehendable and profound. Since they are so crucial to our understanding of reality it
only makes sense that the tools used to build these models would be under a high level of
scrutiny. This work began with the assertion that how agents think is crucial to outcomes
predicted by these models. While this claim may seem quaint, the work contained herein
has shown it is powerful in its veracity.
The heart of this work is the notion of foresight. Developed in the hopes that it would
be a more realistic approach to modeling human and nonhuman behavior it proved to be
a powerful route to promoting cooperation. Central to the notion of foresight is the idea
that people are capable of delayed gratification and that they possess a theory of mind.
These two component yields agents that are willing to forgo immediate payoffs in the hopes
of shaping the future behaviors of their groupmates. This means (as shown in Chapter
2) that individuals are willing to bear the cost of punishing others and thereby overcome
the second-order free-rider effect and hence promote cooperation within the group. The
way this is done is interesting, as we see the impromptu division of labor develop where
dominant individuals focus their efforts on enforcement and the rest of the group is coerced
into contributing towards the public good. These results were a promising debut of foresight
as it managed to successfully solve the second-order free-rider problem by making punishing
a utility increasing action.
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To further explore the potency of foresight we developed a new 2x2 leadership game in
Chapter 3. The goal in doing so was to make a model that was simpler to analyze that
had properties similar to the n-person public goods game. Since a division of labor was
developed in the n-person public goods game with heterogeneity and foresight, we assume
in this simplification that heterogeneity is systemic. This is done by assuming that one
player works as a leader and the other serves as a subordinate. With this simplification we
were able to obtain analytical results that showed the efficacy of foresight. In particular,
it was shown that when foresight was present the leader was willing to bear the brunt of
implementing punishment as they viewed it is a utility increasing action and thus (provided
sufficient emphasis on future payoffs) willingly enforced production of their subordinate.
Additionally, we investigated how other strategy update protocols did at promoting
leadership in my game. I showed that foresight was superior to all the other investigated
methods (in the sense that foresight was the only one to actually promote leadership) aside
from selective imitation which had higher rates of leadership displayed, but had lower joint
payoffs. These results suggest that foresight is a promising explanation as to why individuals
are able to cooperate within the group setting. Hence, future research into it is warranted.
Additionally, we saw that different strategy update protocols resulted in different dynamics.
This suggests that the choice of how agents think is crucial as it impacts the predictions
generated by the model.
Lastly, we investigated another common route to solving CAP - error. Chapter 4 began
with the observation that a propensity to commit errors when choosing the optimal strategy
could be used to explain deviations from the play predicted by game theoretic models. It
proceeded by attempting to bridge a gap in the literature, namely why would humans and
animals not evolve to make best responses and instead utilize a bounded rationality. This
was addressed by the development of an evolutionary model of precision (in the sense of
QRE models). The most important factors in determining the level of precision evolved to
were shown to be the difference in payoffs from cooperating and not cooperating, and the
cost of being more precise. This suggests that the nature of the CAP being participated
in is heavily influential on the exact level of precision evolved to. Keeping this in mind
we examined two different types of CAP problems: the standard prisoner’s dilemma, and
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a linear public goods game. We saw that in the former game the influence of what the
opponent did was crucial in determining the optimal level of precision, while in the latter
there was no impact associated with the groupmates’ behaviors. In an effort to extend our
results, we developed an agent-based model of evolving precision. The idea behind this
was that by developing an agent-based model we would be able to examine extensions that
were impenetrable to standard analytical analysis. The broad strokes of the agent-based
model were in keeping with the predictions of the analytical model even though there were
differences in the exact values predicted. Surprisingly, we saw that the rate of mutation
had a significant impact on the equilibrium values obtained by the agent-based model. In
particular, in species where precision is more susceptible to mutation we would expect to
see higher levels of precision. This suggests that internal factors are just as important as
external pressures when considering the evolution of cognition.
So where do we go from here? Foresight offers plenty of viable avenues for research that
are both exciting and promising. Specifically, investigations into how foresight affects play
in a wider range of games would be beneficial to understanding the new strategy update
protocol better. For instance, foresight has a significant impact on the Nash equilibrium
present in the Hawk-Dove game, but does not seem to affect the Nash equilibrium of the
prisoner’s dilemma. Another thing which should be considered is an evolutionary model of
foresight where the emphasis on future payoffs (ω) is under selective pressures. This could
provide insight into whether we would expect foresight to emerge from a group of individuals
were it is weak or absent. Additionally, attempts should be made to quantify how strong the
emphasis on future payoffs is. This could be done by either borrowing existing experimental
data, or by devising new studies. Finally, investigations into a more generalized n-round
k-level foresight would also be interesting to undertake.
We must also take care to not forget the main lesson of this work, that we should be
careful when making assumptions regarding the cognitive processes of agents as they can
severely impact the predictions produced. With this in mind a meta-analysis of the different
strategy update protocols that have been developed is needed. This would provided future
researchers with better insight into how their assumptions on cognition could influence their
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results. Such an analysis should start with simple, well-established games and then move on
to the more complex variants.
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A

Additional information for Chapter 2

Additional details of numerical simulations
Parameters. In addition to the parameters specified in the text, all simulations were run
using 100 groups, a half-success effort of X0 = 1, a cost parameter of c = 0.5, and the scaling
parameters e = 1.0, φ = 5.0, S0 = 1. All simulations were run for 30,000 time steps, meaning
on average each group underwent 300(1 + E2 ) events (this is because “us vs them” events
include two groups while us vs. nature and cultural group selection events included only
one group affected). Individuals updated their strategies with probability µ = 0.5, which
means on average each individual updated their strategies 150(1 + E2 ) times. Candidate
strategies were generated by perturbing an individual’s current strategy by Gaussian noise
with a standard deviation of σ = 0.5. The standard deviation of the error ξ in evaluating
strengths was ε = 0.10. We performed 20 independent runs for each parameter combination.
Initial conditions. At the start of a run, individuals’ initial efforts were drawn from
a uniform distribution over the interval [0, 0.05].

When applicable, initial punishment

thresholds were assigned in the same way. Individuals were also assigned non-evolvable
strengths si at the beginning of each run (via a uniform distribution over the interval [0, 1])
and then sorted according to their strengths.
Bounds. Individual’s efforts x were restricted to be both nonnegative and below the
quantity

1+B̃vi
c

(to ensure there are no negative payoffs). Punishment thresholds y were

taken to be nonnegative, but had no upper bound in place. In the event that a candidate
strategy was a negative number, we took that candidate strategy to be 0. We did not disallow
repeated candidate strategies. All payoffs were artificially bounded below by 10−5 .
Summary statistics and graphics. During simulations the data were saved every 10th time
steps. Our graphs report the average values obtained after discarding the first 10,000 time
steps. That the reported values correspond to stochastic equilibria was established by visual
inspection of trajectories. Note that all runs were done for a minimum of 30,000 time steps,
which translates into individuals updating their strategies 150 times on average. For each run
the averages of all individuals of equivalent rank are taken across all groups. For the case of
hierarchal groups, stacked histograms were used to relate the measurement corresponding to
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each individuals while simultaneously showing the group total. In the stacked histograms,
the lowest segment corresponds to the dominant individual (with the largest strength s)
while the upper-most corresponds to the weakest group-member. All figures were generated
using the Gnuplot software or Matlab.
Comments. Individuals were allowed to update their punishment thresholds only if they
estimated they were stronger than at least one other individual in their group (that is, if
si > sj + η for at least one other individual j). Moreover, if the cost of punishing exceeds an
individual’s expected payoff, then they simply punish as much as their expected payoff allows.
Our results occasionally show the development of large thresholds by weaker individuals.
These however do not translate into higher actual punishment by such individuals as they
they punish very rarely and only similarly week individuals. The development of this “false
bravado” in weaker individuals becomes less common as precision λ increases. Additionally,
it is absent in stronger individuals since they actively implement punishment.
The model was implemented in C; some of its components were also independently
implemented in Matlab (with similar results). Simulations were run on a cluster.
Additional figures
Basic egalitarian model .

Figure A.1 investigates the effects of benefit b, the precision

parameter λ, and the games frequencies ratio E on the group effort in the egalitarian model.
Note that if the groups are only engaged in “us vs. nature” games (i.e., if E = 1 : 0) and
precision in payoff evaluation is perfect (λ = ∞), groups are predicted to contribute only
if b > cX0 [35, 36]. For parameter values used in Figure A.1, this implies b > 0.5. This is
indeed what is observed in simulations (see the leftmost graph).
Figures A.2 and A.3 use longer runs (100,000 times steps) to illustrates the effects of
parameter K. It shows that with large K and with groups engaged in “us. vs. them” games,
the system does not settle to an equilibrium but exhibits non-equilibrium dynamics even
when precision in payoff evaluation is perfect (λ = ∞).
Basic hierarchy model . Figures A.4, A.5, and A.6 provide additional information on the
effects of various parameters on the individual and group efforts and on the relative payoffs
of individuals of different ranks. In these figures, we explore a wider range of parameters
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than in the main part. Specifically, we use five different values of the precision parameter
(λ = ∞, 80, 40, 20, and 10) in Fig. A.4, five different values of the number of candidate
strategies (K = 1, 2, 4, 8, and 16) in Fig. A.5, and five different values of the frequency of
cultural group selection events (E3 = 0.00, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, and 0.20) in Fig. A.6.
Egalitarian model with foresight and punishment in “us vs. nature” games. Figure A.7
shows the effect of foresight in the most basic case of our model. Namely, we assume
that groups are egalitarian and only participating in “us vs nature” games. This is done to
highlight the presence of the threshold effect established in prior works [35, 36], and illustrate
how foresight overcomes the second-order free rider-effect. For the parameter values used,
individuals without foresight should not contribute when b ≤ 1. The leftmost graph in
Fig. A.7 shows that when foresight is absent (ω = 0) then individuals only contribute for
the cases of b = 1.25, 1.50, 1.75, and 2.00. When foresight is present (ω = 0.50), however,
we see contributions in the cases of b = 0.75, and 1.00 as well. The reason for this is that
foresight successfully solves the second-order free-rider effect as illustrated by the emergence
of positive threshold values (centermost graph). It is important to note, that while foresight
does promote cooperation, it does not necessarily increase the groups payoffs (rightmost
graph). This is because of punishment costs.
Hierarchy model with foresight and punishment. In contrast to the figures in the main
text, here we also show the punishment thresholds, the loss of payoffs due to punishing others
and the total payoffs. Figure A.8 shows the interactions of foresight ω, group size N , and
the game frequencies ratio E for λ = 40. Figure A.9 shows the interactions of foresight ω,
group size N , and precision λ for E = 1 : 1. Figure A.10 shows the interactions of benefit b,
group size N , and the hierarchy steepness β for ω = 0.5, λ = 40, and E = 1 : 1.
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Figure A.1: Effects of the precision parameter λ, the games frequencies ratio E, and the
average benefit b on the group effort X in the basic egalitarian model. For each value of
E, the bars (from left to right) correspond to b = 0.00, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.00. Results are the
averages of 20 simulations using: N = 8, c = 0.5, X0 = 1.0, K = 2, and E3 = 0.1.
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Figure A.2: Effects of the games frequencies ratio E, and the number of candidate strategies
K on group efforts X in the basic egalitarian model with perfect precision, i.e. λ = ∞. For
each value of E, the bars (from left to right) correspond to K = 1, 2, 4, 8, and 16. Results
are the averages of 20 simulations using: N = 8, b = 1.0, c = 0.5, X0 = 1.0, and E3 = 0.0.
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Figure A.3: Time series summarizing the effects of the games frequencies ratio E (varies by
row), and the number of candidate strategies K (varies by column) on group efforts X in the
basic egalitarian model with perfect precision, i.e. λ = ∞. The x-axis uses units of 100,000
timesteps. Results are the averages of 20 simulations using: N = 8, b = 1.0, c = 0.5, X0 = 1.0,
and E3 = 0.0.
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Figure A.6: Effect of the game frequencies ratio E, the precision parameter λ, and the
frequency of cultural group selection events E3 on the group effort X and the relative payoffs
π of individuals of different ranks in the basic hierarchical model. The 1st and 2nd rows
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Figure A.8: Effects of the foresight parameter ω, the group size N , and the game frequencies
ratio E in the full model for precision λ = 40. The first column contains results for N = 4,
the second for N = 8, and the third for N = 16. The rows from top to bottom summarize
the effort levels X, the total payoffs Π, the relative payoffs π, the thresholds y, the cost of
punishing δ, the punishment inflicted p, and the punishment incurred q. For each value of
ω, the bars (from left to right) correspond to E = 1 : 0, 1 : 1, 0 : 1. The segments of each
bar correspond to a particular individual with the dominant at the bottom (purple) and the
weakest at the top. Results are the averages of 20 simulations using: b = 1.0, c = 0.5, β =
1, K = 2, and E3 = 0.1.
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Figure A.9: Effects of the foresight parameter ω, the group size N , and the precision λ
in the full model. The first column contains results for N = 4, the second for N = 8, and
the third for N = 16. The rows from top to bottom summarize the effort levels X, the total
payoffs Π, the relative payoffs π, the thresholds y, the cost of punishing δ, the punishment
inflicted p, and the punishment incurred q. For each value of ω, the bars (from left to right)
correspond to λ = ∞, 40, 10. The segments of each bar correspond to a particular individual
with the dominant at the bottom (purple) and the weakest at the top. Results are the
averages of 20 simulations using: b = 1.0, c = 0.5, β = 1, K = 2, E = 1 : 1, and E3 = 0.1.
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Figure A.10: Effects of the expected benefit b, the group size N , and hierarchy steepness
β in the full model. The first column contains results for N = 4, the second for N = 8, and
the third for N = 16. The rows from top to bottom summarize the effort levels X, the total
payoffs Π, the relative payoffs π, the thresholds y, the cost of punishing δ, the punishment
inflicted p, and the punishment incurred q. For each value of b, the bars (from left to right)
correspond to β = 1, 2, 4. The segments of each bar correspond to a particular individual
with the dominant at the bottom (purple) and the weakest at the top. Results are the
averages of 20 simulations using: c = 0.5, K = 2, λ = 40, E = 1 : 1, E3 = 0.1 and ω = 0.50.
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B

Additional information for Chapter 3

B.1

Classic inspection game

In the classic Inspection Game, there is a worker who works for a principal [33]. The worker
can choose to shirk (S) or work (W), where working costs the worker g and produces output
of value v for the principal. The principal can either inspect (I) or not inspect (NI). The
act of inspecting costs the principal h but is allows the principal to determine if the worker
shirked or not. Now the principal is set to pay the worker a wage of w unless they have
evidence that the worker shirked. Additional assumptions are that w > g > h > 0. This
yields the game as described in Table B.1. Now this game has no pure-strategy equilibrium,

but does have a mixed Nash equilibrium at (x, y) = w−h
, wg , where x is the probability
w
that the worker shirks, and y is the probability that the principal inspects.
Table B.1: Payoff matrix for the classic Inspection Game [33].

Worker

Works
Shirks

Principal
Inspect
Don’t Inspect
w − g, v − w − h w − g, v − w
0, −h
w, −w

The Inspection Game – along with related models – has been used to investigate the
relationship between employers and their employees [] as well as between criminals and
police [118, 119].
Table B.2: Parameters in the leadership game.
Parameter
b
c
d
h
k
θ

Range
b ∈ (0, ∞)
c ∈ (0, ∞)
d ∈ (0, ∞)
h ∈ (0, ∞)
0≤b
θ ∈ [0, 1]

Interpretation
Benefit produced by a single subordinate
Cost of contributing to a single subordinate
Punishment incurred by noncontributing subordinate
Cost of inspecting to a leader
Cost of punishing to a leader
Taxation rate
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B.2

Deriving the foresight utility function for the leader

Recall, the expected payoff to the leader inspecting with probability y a subordinate who is
producing with probability x, is given by
πL (x, y) = θbx − (h + k(1 − x))y.
Recall, foresight is meant to balance what you expect to happen in the next round with
what you expect to happen in the next-next round as a consequence of your actions in the
next round. To introduce foresight we must first establish some new variables. Let y be
the probability the leader inspects in the next round, and y 0 be the probability the leader
inspects in the next-next round. Note that the leader has complete control over both the
variables y and y 0 . Similarly, let x be the probability the subordinate produces in the next
round. This is assumed to be an estimate made by the leader based on previous interactions.
Finally, let x0 be the probability the subordinate produces in the next-next round in response
to the leader choosing y in the next round. This means x0 can be interpreted as the leader’s
model of how the subordinate will respond to their actions in the next round. We define the
leader’s one-step foresight utility by
ΠL (x, y, y 0 ) = (1 − ω)πL (x, y) + ωπL (x0 , y 0 )
= (1 − ω)(θbx − (h + k(1 − x))y) + ω(θbx0 − (h + k(1 − x0 ))y 0 ).
Now since the leader has absolute control over y 0 and it doesn’t affect any other variables it
would only make sense to set it to 0. This yields the equation
ΠL (x, y, y 0 ) = (1 − ω)(θbx − (h + k(1 − x))y) + ω(θbx0 ).
Now θbx is nothing more than a constant as the leader can’t affect it directly or indirectly,
and so we may disregard it from future consideration. This yields,
ΠL (x, y, y 0 ) = (1 − ω)(−(h + k(1 − x))y) + ω(θbx0 ),
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which is what we refer to as the leader’s one-step foresight utility.

B.3

Foresight for subordinate

Let us briefly consider the effect that foresight based on best response has on the
subordinate’s payoff. We have that
ΠS (x, x0 , y0 ) = (1 − ω)πS (x, y0 ) + ωπS (x0 , y 0 )
= (1 − ω)πS (x, y0 ) + ωπS (x0 , 0)
= (1 − ω) [[(1 − θ)b − c]x − dy0 (1 − x)] + ω[(1 − θ)b − c]x0
and so in the case of x0 being the best response we reduce to ΠS = (1 − ω)πS , which means
the subordinate’s payoff is just reduced. In the case of x0 = x we have
ΠS (x, y0 ) = [(1 − θ)b − c]x − (1 − ω)dy0 (1 − x),
which just means that the impact of punishment is reduced and so there are no qualitative
changes.

B.4

Deriving optimal inspection rates

Combining this with what we have above, we know that the leader’s prediction of what the
subordinate will do in round 1 is given by

x̃1 =











0

if q0 < qcrit

χ ∈ [0, 1]

if q0 = qcrit .

1

if q0 > qcrit

Here and below χ is any number within the interval [0, 1]. So we have three cases to consider.
First case is when q0 < qcrit which implies that x̃1 = 0. In this case we have that
EL = q{ωθb − (1 − ω)(h + k)},
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which implies the leader’s optimal strategy (q ∗ ) is given by

q∗ =











0

if ωθb < (1 − ω)(h + k)

χ ∈ [0, 1]

if ωθb = (1 − ω)(h + k)

1

if ωθb > (1 − ω)(h + k)

The next case is when q0 = qcrit which implies that x̃1 is some constant between 0 and 1,
which we will refer to for now as x∗ . In this case we have that
EL = (1 − ω)θbx∗ + q{ωθb − (1 − ω)(h + k(1 − x∗ ))},
which implies



0


q ∗ = χ ∈ [0, 1]




1

if ωθb < (1 − ω)(h + k(1 − x∗ ))
if ωθb = (1 − ω)(h + k(1 − x∗ ))
if ωθb > (1 − ω)(h + k(1 − x∗ ))

Finally, we have the case of q0 > qcrit which implies that x̃1 = 1. In this case we have that
EL = (1 − ω)θb + q{ωθb − (1 − ω)h},
which implies



0


q ∗ = χ ∈ [0, 1]




1

B.5

if ωθb < (1 − ω)h
if ωθb = (1 − ω)h
if ωθb > (1 − ω)h

Deriving critical points

The expected payoff of choosing strategy q to the leader is thus given by
EL = (1 − ω)(θbx̃1 − (h + k(1 − x̃1 ))E[y1 ]) + ωθbE[x̃2 ]
= (1 − ω)(θbE[x̃1 ] − (h + k(1 − E[x̃1 ]))q) + ωθbp̃(q)
= (1 − ω)(θbE[x̃1 ] − (h + k(1 − E[x̃1 ]))q) + ωθb
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1
,
1 + exp{λ(c − (1 − θ)b − dq)}

where E[x̃1 ] is the expected action of the subordinate in the first round, which is given by
E[x̃1 ] = p̃(q0 ) =

1
.
1+exp{λ(c−(1−θ)b−dq0 )}

Our goal is to solve the above equation for q ∗ , i.e. the probability of inspection which
yields the highest expected payoff. To do this we compute the derivative of the leader’s
forecasted payoff with respect to the leader’s strategy, which yields
∂q EL = −(1 − ω)(h + k(1 − E[x̃1 ])) + ωθb

λd exp{λ(c − (1 − θ)b − dq)}
,
(1 + exp{λ(c − (1 − θ)b − dq)})2

and set ∂q EL = 0 to solve for the critical points. This yields the critical points 0, 1 and
"
#
p
B − 2C ± B [B − 4C]
−1
ln
,
q± =
λd
2AC
where A = exp{λ(c − (1 − θ)b)}, B = ωθbλd, and C = (1 − ω)(h + k(1 − E[x̃1 ])).

B.6

Cross’s model with foresight

In Figure 3.6 (right column), we add foresight to Cross’ learning process by using the leader’s
forecasted payoff (Equation (3.9)) instead of their regular payoff. We immediately see
increases in the frequency with which the leader and subordinate inspect and contribute,
respectively. Additionally, for the leader we see increases in θ are now seem to be met with
increases in q ∗ . This is a result of foresight allowing the leader to properly capitalize on their
role as enforcer.
Figure B.2 shows in more detail how the foresight parameter ω affects the equilibrium
values achieved in Cross’ learning model. We see as ω increases so to does the frequency we
expect the leader to inspect, which in turn increases the frequency we expect the subordinate
to contribute. However, even when ω = 1 we don’t see the leader always inspecting or the
subordinate always producing.
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Figure B.1: The effects of the benefit b and the tax rate θ on the equilibrium frequencies
of production p∗ and inspection q ∗ in Cross’ reinforced learning process. Left (a and c):
foresight is absent. Right (b and d): foresight is present (with ω = 0.5). Top (a and b): p∗ .
Bottom (c and d): q ∗ . In each graph, the clusters of bars correspond to b = 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5;
within each cluster the bars (from left to right) correspond to tax rate θ = 0.25, 0.50, 0.75.
The error bars denote the 95% confidence intervals. Simulations were run for 100,000 time
steps; 500 independent runs. Other parameters: c = 2, d = 2, h = 0.1, k = 1, and λ = 4.
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Figure B.2: The impact of foresight parameter ω on learning in Cross’ model in 500
independent runs. The lines represent the average frequency over 500 independent runs
of inspection (solid) and contribution (dashed). Parameter values: T = 5000, K = 2, b =
1.0, c = 1.0, d = 1.0, h = 0.25, k = 1.0, θ = 0.5 and λ = 10.
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Figure B.3: Effect of the precision parameter λ on the Quantal Response Equilibrium
values p∗ and q ∗ . Parameters: b = 1, c = 2, d = 2, h = 0.1, k = 1, and θ = 0.5.

B.7

Additional Figures

Figure B.3 shows the effects of the precision parameter λ on the Quantal Response
Equilibrium in the leadership game without foresight. Figure B.4 shows a typical time-series
in Cross’ reinforced learning process.
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Figure B.4: Time series showing the evolution of strategies in Cross’ reinforced learning
process in 500 independent runs. The light red and blue lines are the individual leaders’ and
subordinates’ values at time t, while the bold red and blue lines are the average strategies.
Parameters: b = 1, c = 2, d = 2, h = 0.25, k = 1, and θ = 0.5.
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